Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who report workplace race or gender discrimination. The issue examined by the US Supreme Court in Crawford v. Metro Government of Nashville, was whether this protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation. The basic holding by the Supreme Court on the issue can be summed up the Court’s statement:

Nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when asked a question.

The Court explained Title VII’s two anti-retaliation provisions:

The Title VII antiretaliation provision has two clauses, making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–3(a). The one is known as the “opposition clause,” the other as the “participation clause,” and Crawford accused Metro of violating both.

The lower court in the Sixth Circuit in this case held that the plaintiff could not satisfy the opposition clause because she had not “instigated or initiated any complaint,” but had “merely answered questions by investigators in an already-pending internal investigation, initiated by someone else.”

The Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s rational. The Court reiterated that under the Farragher/Ellerth defense, when no tangible employment action is taken against an employee, the employer may invoke a defense to the employee’s claim if it took reasonable care to prevent/correct and discrimination, and the employee failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the employer to prevent or to correct the discrimination. The Court explained that the lower court’s rational, if applied here would create a catch-22 for the employee:

The appeals court’s rule would thus create a real dilemma for any knowledgeable employee in a hostile work environment if the boss took steps to assure a defense under our cases. If the employee reported discrimination in response to the inquiries, the employer might well be free to penalize her for speaking up. But if she kept quiet about the discrimination and later filed a Title VII claim, the employer might well escape liability, arguing that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct [any discrimination] promptly” but “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of . . .preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.”

The Take-Away for Employers:

  1. Investigate all employee workplace complaints;
  2. Document the investigation well (such as who was spoken to, who conducted the investigation, and what was said);
  3. Take all reasonable steps to stop improper workplace conduct discovered during the investigation; and
  4. Ensure that no one who participates in the investigation is retaliated against for providing information during the investigation.

The Ohio Employment Law Blog and the Connecticut Employment Law Blog have also posted their great analysis on this case. 

Yes, the Government Code specifically addresses employees’ right to wear pants to work in California.

Section 12947.5 states:

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to permit an employee to wear pants on account of the sex of the employee.
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer from requiring employees in a particular occupation to wear a uniform.

Also, employers should note, dress standards or requirements for personal appearance need to be flexible enough to take into account religious practices. While it is lawful for an employer to implement rules about employee physical appearance, grooming, or dress standards, the standards cannot discriminate based on a protected category, such as race or sex.

This graph is courtesy of Seth Godin.  Generous and calm are good business practices to abide by everyday, but I think employers need to especially remind themselves of this practice during these times. 

I would also like add another quality in the upper right hand corner – less litigation.  Angry and selfish employers leave employees no choice but to seek out a lawyer because they think they’ve been wronged (mistakenly or not). 

UPDATE: I revised the original image to include my comments:

The question whether an employer is obligated to pay an employee for time on-call depends on interpretation of the term “hours worked.”

In a recent opinion regarding class action issues (Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, LTD), an appellate court offered an analysis of what would be considered “hours worked” and, therefore, entitling the employee to pay. The court examined this definition by turning to the IWC’s Wage Order No. 9. This provision defines “hours worked” as “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.”

The court also looked to California’s Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE). The DLSE offers opinions on California employment issues, and while the DLSE’s opinions are not binding on the courts, they are given some weight by the courts. The court in Diva explained the DLSE opinion letter on the issue of what constitutes hours worked by an employee:

One such advisory letter, issued on March 31, 1993,  acknowledges the inquiry is “highly fact-driven,” but “[t]he bottom line consideration is the amount of ‘control’ exercised by the employer over the activities of the worker. . . . [I]mmediate control by the employer which is for the benefit of the employer must be compensated.”

The court continued to explain that in another opinion letter dated December 28, 1998, the DLSE summarized the factors relevant to this inquiry:

  1. Whether there are excessive geographic restrictions on the employee’s movements;
  2. Whether the frequency of calls is unduly restrictive;
  3. Whether a fixed time limit for response is unduly restrictive;
  4. Whether the on-call employee can easily trade his or her on-call responsibilities with another employee; and
  5. Whether and to what extent the employee engages in personal activities during on-call periods.

While the court’s decision is primarly dealing with class action issues, this analysis of what constitutes compensatable time is a good overview.

The talk around the Internet these days is all about how times are changing and how someone actually found a use for Twitter.  Technology has already changed the legal profession, but we have just barely taken full advantage of the gains that the legal profession can obtain.  I believe we are on the cusp of a major revolution in the legal field, and here are my predictions about how technology will change the legal profession within the next ten years:

Courts

  • New complaints will be published on the Internet, and companies (and individuals) can establish RSS feeds to allow them if they have been sued.
  • Google will index all case law.  This will directly compete with LexisNexis and Westlaw, allowing attorneys to conduct research at a fraction of the costs charged by these two companies. People will post comments about the opinions within the opinions themselves on the Internet. I am sure this would be more helpful than Westlaw’s Keycite.
  • Parties will be able to serve papers via email or through the Internet.  Sound far fetched?  A court in Australlia recently allowed a party to perform substitute service via Facebook.  Service by email is probably more secure than traditional mail anyway.
  • Attorneys will make routine court appearances via the Internet.
  • Voice recognition software will instantaneously transcribe court proceedings and depositions. This would eliminate a huge litigation cost – court reporters. I have nothing against court reporters, but they need to change their business model just like the music industry.
  • Attorneys will utilize technology in trials to make multi-media presentations to keep jurors’ attention and more persuasive cases for their clients. Trials, however, will not be conducted remotely over the Internet – attorneys need to be in the same room when presenting to the jurors.
  • The court system will become a paperless system. Parties will be required to file documents electronically. Courts will issue orders via email or posting on the Internet (attorneys will be able to subscribe via RSS feeds). Courts will not issue a single piece of paper, nor will they store a single piece of paper – saving a huge amount of money in terms of storage and labor in maintaining the files.  

Lawyers

  • Law firms will also move to paperless offices. It is necessary that the courts make this move first to give the lawyers opportunities to file documents electronically.
  • Law firms will make files available on-line for clients.
  • Lawyers will conduct webinars to train clients.
  • Small firms with specialized attorneys will come to dominate the legal field. Small firms can collaborate through the internet, and have equal (if not more) resources than large law firms. Large law firms are simply a group of various attorneys with different specializations using the same letterhead – and carrying a lot of overhead.

Clients

  • Will demand that their attorneys have a blog (or the newest way of publishing content on the Internet) in order to truly see that the lawyer understands the particular area of law the case involves and to see how the lawyer thinks.
  • Clients will demand that their lawyers understand how to use the internet to conduct background research on the opposition.
  • Clients will demand that their lawyers are utilizing technology to provide legal services more efficiently.

UPDATE:  The Complex Litigator just blogged about Alameda Court streaming a live feed for a jury trial in a complex personal injury case.  The case will be available through www.courtroomlive.com, and of course will be indexed for viewing at any time.  This leads me to another bullet point under how lawyers could use technology to improve their litigation skills: to review and improve their courtroom skills after a trial. 

 

Today, the California Supreme Court granted reivew of Brinkley v. Public Storage, Inc.:

BRINKLEY v. PUBLIC STORAGE INC.
Case: S168806, Supreme Court of California

Date (YYYY-MM-DD): 2009-01-14
Event Description: Review granted/briefing deferred (8.512(d)(2) civil case)
Notes:
The petition for review is GRANTED. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, S166350 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court.

The lower appellate court in Brinkley basically had the same holding as the lower court in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, that employers need to only provide, not ensure, employees with their 30-minute meal break under California law.  The California Supreme Court granted review of Brinker, which meant that employers could not rely upon the very helpful ruling.  Then Brinkley was decided shoretly thereafter by another appellate court, which still allowed employers to argue that they only need to provide meal breaks.  But because of this recent action by the Court, the standard will finally be clarified by the California Supreme Court. 

It is likely to take at least one year for the Suprme Court to provide a ruling in Brinker.

In Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, LTD, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s class certification motion and remanded the case with instructions that the trial court certify the class action.  The case was brought by a limousine driver who filed a wage and hour class action against Diva Limousine, LTD. The main issue in the case was Diva’s policy of paying its drivers an hourly rate for assigned trips but failing to pay for on-call time between assignments. This on-call time is referred to as “gap time.”

Background Facts Of Limousine Drivers Time Working

The drivers were notified about their first few driving assignments before their shifted started. The court noticed that about 75% of the drivers were allowed to take Diva cars home and use the cars to drive to their first assignment. After these first few assignments were completed, the drivers received additional assignments from dispatch given the drivers’ location, availability and fairness among the drivers. The drivers could not predict the amount of gap time during any given day.

Diva established policies in its “Chauffeur’s Handbook.” Among the policies, Diva did not allow drivers to use the cars for personal use, drivers were required to stay near the vehicle, and to remain in uniform. The drivers were required to use the gap time to take their meal and rest breaks. However, the breaks could be interrupted dispatched to an assignment. Diva tracked the vehicles using GPS systems.

The plaintiff, Ghazaryan filed his lawsuit alleging Diva by its practice of paying drivers by the job, not by the hour, had failed to pay earned wages and overtime or to provide required rest breaks and meal periods in violation of multiple provisions of the Labor Code and regulations.

Class Certification Issues

Diva opposed class certification arguing that the difficulties in identifying eligible members of the class and assessing the validity of Diva’s compensation policy for different classification of drivers.  Diva also argued that the drivers may or may not have used their gap time for personal pursuits, adding to the individualized inquiry necessary in this case.  

Diva had several different categories of drivers assigned different driving responsibilities (including organ transplant drivers). Diva that some drivers were paid for gap-time, and some were not paid for this time.

The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for class certification. In explaining the lower court’s error, the appellate court explained:

The trial court is, of course, correct, under well-established Supreme Court authority, “The certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is legally or factually meritorious.’” (Sav-On Drug Stores, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) But the trial court fundamentally misconceived the import of the rule against evaluating the merits of the plaintiff’s claims in deciding whether class treatment is appropriate. Rather than denying certification because it cannot reach the merits, as the court did here, the trial court must evaluate whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment: “As the focus in a certification dispute is on what type of questions common or individual are likely to arise in the action, rather than on the merits of the case [citations], in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a trial court’s certification order, [the reviewing court] consider[s] whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.”

Ascertainability and Numerosity

The appellate court held that the Plaintiff’s proposed class was ascertainable and numerous enough to be certified as a class action. The court explained that the class could be identified by Diva’s employment records and that class members “are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records.” Diva argued that differences in how the drivers were paid makes the class unascertainable. The court disagreed:

Yet the existence of these separate assignments in no way renders Ghazaryan’s proposed class unascertainable. If some drivers worked exclusively in one of these categories, they can simply be excluded from recovery if liability is ultimately found. Alternatively, the class can be modified to specify only those drivers who were not paid for their on-call or gap time. This modification may not even be necessary if, as we suspect, few Diva drivers fall exclusively into a single category.

Based on this, and the fact that there were approximately 170 current and former drivers who worked for Diva, the appellate court held that the class is ascertainable and numerous enough to proceed as a class action.

Community of Interest

The court found Diva’s policies about how drivers could use the gap-time applied to the drivers uniformly. The requirements, for example, that drivers remain with the vehicles, must take new dispatch assignment, not use the vehicle for personal purposes, and remain in uniform applied to all drivers equally. The court noted that "the common legal question remains the overall impact of Diva’s policies on its drivers, not whether any one driver, through the incidental convenience of having a home or gym nearby to spend his or her gap time, successfully finds a way to utilize that time for his or her own purposes."

Superiority

The court also held that it did not see any advantage to not allowing the case to proceed as a class action and voiced concerns that employees may not be able to find adequate representation if required to pursue their own individual claims.  Therefore, plaintiff met the superiority requirement to proceed as a class action. 

Just approved more members to the California HR Network group in Linkedin.  There are approximately 100 members currently. 

If you are an HR professional with a need to keep current with California employment law, drop me an email to request to join the group, or request to join through Linkedin by visiting here. 

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act:

The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is a response to a 2007 Supreme Court decision that made it more difficult to sue over past pay discrimination, and prevented Ledbetter from filing an employment discrimination claim. The WSJ notes this is, in effect, and earmark for the plaintiff’s trial lawyers:

[The Supreme Court’s] ruling put to rest Ms. Ledbetter’s creative theory that decisions made decades ago by a former boss affected her pay all the way to retirement, so that each paycheck was a new discriminatory act and thus fell within the statute of limitations. Yet that is exactly the theory Congress would now revive with the Ledbetter bill. There would no longer be time limits on such discrimination claims. They could be brought long after evidence had disappeared or witnesses had died — as was the case with Ms. Ledbetter’s former boss.

For the tort bar, this is pure gold. It would create a new legal business in digging up ancient workplace grievances. . .

The Paycheck Fairness Act:

The Paycheck Fairness Act clearifies the 1963 Equal Pay Act by making clear that victims of gender-based discrimination can sue for compensatory and punitive damages.  It also moves the burden to employers to prove that pay differences are job-related and not sex-based.  It also bars employers from retaliating against workers who discuss or disclose salary information with their co-workers.