Today is the first time I heard that courts have having problems with jurors using Twitter during trials. Am I surprised?  Not one bit. Is it concerning?  Yes.

The article mentions that most of the messages sent via this form of "microbloging" are innocuous, and are simply jurors saying that they are bored during trials.  There was one case in Philadelphia this week in which the juror twittered that a decision was reached in a high profile case and there would be an "announcement on Monday." 

Jurors are ignoring (or simply not listening to) the Court’s instructions not to discuss the case with anyone. 

Should jury instructions be revised to include a non-twitter policy?

There is discussion now that jury instructions need to be updated to inform jurors that they cannot discuss the facts of the case on the Internet.  I think a judge should probably admonish the jurors about posting anything on the Internet about the case during proceedings is strictly forbidden given how pervasive Web 2.0 has become. As for jurors who think they can get away with this are mistaken, and it still amazes me about how many people seem to forget that everything they do on the Internet is recorded – forever. 

Take away for lawyers:

If you were the attorney presenting when the juror posted that he/she was bored – time to reevaluate your case theme and trial presentation skills. 

Plaintiff, who was a trash truck driver for Athens Disposal Company, Inc., filed a class action against the company alleging violations of the Labor Code.  Plaintiff asserted the following causes of action against Athens:

  1. Failing to pay overtime.
  2. Failing to provide meal periods and to pay an additional hour of compensation per workday to employees who missed a meal period.
  3. Failing to provide rest periods and to pay an additional hour of compensation per workday to employees who missed a rest period.
  4. Failing to provide necessary payroll information to employees and failing to maintain records on each employee showing all hours worked and all meal periods taken.
  5. Civil penalties authorized by the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) for violating the Labor Code.
  6. Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).

Immediately after the lawsuit was filed, Athens filed a petition to compel arbitration based on a written agreement with plaintiff. The arbitration agreement contained a provision waiving class arbitrations and also precluded an employee from acting in “a private attorney general capacity,” which would bar plaintiff’s enforcement of the Labor Code on behalf of other employees.

The court held that the entire arbitration agreement was not enforceable:

We conclude that the class arbitration waiver is unconscionable with respect to the alleged violations of the meal and rest period laws given “the modest size of the potential individual recovery, the potential for retaliation against members of the class, [and] the fact that absent members of the class may be ill informed about their rights.” (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 463 (Gentry).) In addition, because the arbitration agreement prevents plaintiff from acting as a private attorney general, it conflicts with the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (§§ 2698–2699.5) — an act that furthers Gentry’s goal of comprehensively enforcing state labor laws through statutory sanctions (see Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 462–463).

The court noted that the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement by itself was unenforceable, which may have been severed from the arbitration agreement. However, when coupled with the employee’s waiver of action as a private attorney general, the entire agreement was unenforceable.

The case, Franco v. Athens Disposal Company, Inc., can be downloaded for a short period of time from the court’s website in PDF or Word.
 

What does the agreement have to be titled?

I was recently asked if the severance agreement needs to have a specific title in order to be valid. The title does not have to contain specific words, and are usually titled "general release" or "severance agreement." The title, unless it is clearly erroneous or confusing, does not change the type of agreement or the rights the parties are agreement to release. The key here is what the parties are actually releasing in the terms of the document. 

What claims can the parties agree to release?

Release of Unknown Claims

The idea of the severance agreement is to buy some certainty that there will be no litigation following the employee’s separation from the company. The employee (and employer for that matter) can waive all known claims. However, in California, for any party to release unknown claims, the agreement needs to be clear and advise the party that they are releasing unknown claims. Ideally, the agreement should set forth section 1542 of the Civil Code, which states:

A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.

Release of Age Claims For Older Workers (over 40 years old)

The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA) provides workers over 40 years old with additional rights. The OWBPA places additional requirements on employers asking “old” employees to waive their potential claims the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Here is a summary of the requirements employers need to meet:

  • The agreement must be written in a manner that the employee can understand.
  • The waiver specifically refers to the employee’s claims or rights under the ADEA.
  • The employee cannot waive claims that have not yet arisen
  • There must be consideration (the employer must give value to the employee which was not already owed to the employee – this has to be present in every severance agreement, not just those releasing age claims)
  • The employee is advised to consult with an attorney
  • The employee is given at least 21 days to consider the agreement (the employer may have to offer up to 45 days – the employer should check with counsel to see if this is necessary); and
  • The agreement may be revoked up to 7 days after it is executed.

Other Provisions To Consider For Severance Agreements

An employer should also consider if the agreement needs to address other issues, such as:

  • Is the release mutual (i.e., the employer and employee are both releasing all claims against each other)?
  • Should there be a non-competition/trade secrets provision?
  • Is the agreement confidential? If so, is there a liquidated damages provision where the parties agree to a certain monetary amount the breaching party will pay?
  • Will the employer provide a reference statement? If so, the language of the statement should be set forth in the agreement.
  • Should there be an arbitration provision to deal with any issues that arise from the severance agreement?
  • Should the employer include a choice of law clause in the agreement that determines which state law will be controlling in the case of a dispute?

 

In Chindarah v. Pick Up Stix, Inc. (February 26, 2009) the court of appeal held that employers may enter into settlement agreements with current and former employees over disputed wage claims. At issue in the case was whether the employer’s settlement and release agreements entered into with individual employees settling disputed overtime wages were valid and enforceable under California law. Thankfully for the thousands of employers in California who have entered into settlement agreements regarding wage and hour claims, the appellate court held the agreements are enforceable.

Two former employees of Pick Up Stix sued for claims for unpaid overtime, penalties and interest due to the misclassification of their jobs as exempt from overtime pay. The employer participated in a mediation, but to no success. Stix then decided to approach the putative class members on its own in an attempt to settlement with them individually. Stix offered the putative class members an amount that the employees would have received under the amount offered by Stix during the mediation. More than two hundred current and former employees accepted the settlement amount and signed a general release. The release acknowledged that the employees had spent more than 50% of their time performing managerial duties and agreed “not to participate in any class action that may include …any of the released Claims….” The release also provided:

In exchange for the release from Employee set forth below, the Company will pay Employee by check the gross amount of [varied amounts] less payroll deductions, in full and complete satisfaction of all issues and claims by Employee for unpaid overtime, penalties, interest and other Labor Code violations for the time period of February 28, 1999 through September 2003.

Plaintiffs challenged the settlement agreements arguing that the agreements were void under Labor Code sections 206 and 206.5.

Labor Code section 206.5 provides:

An employer shall not require the execution of a release of a claim or right on account of wages due, or to become due, or made as an advance on wages to be earned, unless payment of those wages has been made. A release required or executed in violation of the provisions of this section shall be null and void as between the employer and the employee. Violation of the provisions of this section by the employer is be a misdemeanor.

In regards to the waivability of overtime rights, Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a) provides:

Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Plaintiffs argued that the release in this case was void as a matter of law to the extent it releases claims for any wages actually due and unpaid and because it constitutes an agreement to work for less than the overtime compensation actually due and unpaid. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument:

The Plaintiffs claim “wages actually due and unpaid” means wages that are disputed, if they are ultimately found to be owing. In other words, the Plaintiffs claim any settlement of a dispute over overtime compensation runs afoul of sections 206.5 and 1194.

The court also noted various federal court cases that have also reached the same conclusion. In Reynov v. ADP Claims Services Group, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Apr.30, 2007), after plaintiff quit his job, he signed an agreement releasing the employer “from ‘all claims, actions, and causes of action, of every kind, nature, and description, which exist as of the date you sign the Letter Agreement, arising out of or related to your employment.’” As consideration for the release, the plaintiff received “substantial compensation to which he was not otherwise entitled, including a severance payment in excess of $29,000.” The plaintiff argued the release was unenforceable under section 206.5. Relying on other state court cases, the Reynov court found that section 206.5 prohibited a release of wages due unless paid in full, and “wages are not due if there is a good faith dispute as to whether they are owed. Because [the employer’s] defense that [the plaintiff] was an exempt employee under California law would, if successful, preclude any recovery for [the plaintiff], a bona fide dispute exists and the overtime pay cannot be considered ‘concededly due.’” (citations omitted)

The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the newly decided case of Edwards v. Arthur Andersen (2008) supports their position. The Plaintiffs contended that because the Supreme Court found in Edwards that an employee’s statutorily unwaivable indemnity rights under Labor Code section 2802 could not be waived as part of a general release, a dispute over past overtime wages cannot be settled. The court recognized that an employee cannot waive his or her right to overtime pay under Labor Code section 1194 (as well as other statutorily provided rights), but the court also reasoned that there was not statute prohibiting employees from releasing their claims to past overtime as settlement “of a bona fide dispute over those wages.”

In conclusion, the court reasoned the public policy underlying section 1194 to protect worker from employer coercion to forgo overtime is not violated by its holding. The releases here were to settle disputes about whether the employees were properly paid in the past and the agreements did not bar employees from suing over future violations.

The opinion can be downloaded from the court’s website here in Word or PDF.
 

As a matter of law, Plaintiffs’ cannot recovery punitive damages for Labor Code violations. Brewer v. Premier Golf Properties (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252. In Brewer, the court stated:

We are convinced, both by application of the “new right-exclusive remedy” doctrine and under more general principles that bar punitive damages awards absent breach of an obligation not arising from con-tract, punitive damages are not recoverable when liability is premised solely on the employer’s violation of the Labor Code statutes that regulate meal and rest breaks, pay stubs, and minimum wage laws.

Ibid. In Brewer, the plaintiff sought damages for pay stub violations, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, and meal and rest break wages. The court explained that Brewer’s claims for Labor Code violations arose from rights based on her employment contract, and therefore she was not entitled to recover punitive damages. Despite the clear holding in Brewer, I still routinely see punitive damages asked for in wage and hour cases.
 

California law has held that “employer” does not include an entity’s agents, and therefore there is no personal liability for Labor Code violations. Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1087-88; Jones v. Gregory (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 798, 805. The California Supreme Court explained in Reynolds that under common law, corporate agents are not personally liable, and that the Labor Code does not provide a definition of employer that would warrant imposing personal liability on corporate officers for non-payment of wages.

The key quotes from the Reynolds court:

“This is true regardless of whether a corporation’s failure to pay such wages, in particular circumstances, breaches only its employment contract or also breaches a tort duty of care.”

“It is ‘well established that corporate agents and employees acting for and on behalf of a corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a breach of the corporation’s contract.’ ”

“And ‘[d]irectors or officers of a corporation do not incur personal liability for torts of the corporation merely by reason of their official position…’ ”
 

The WSJ recently reported, there is a trend that discrimination based lawsuits fair a lot worse than most other cases filed in federal court. A study found that discrimination cases lose at a higher rate and are more likely to be dismissed at early stages in the lawsuit. The article reports:

The odds against winning discrimination cases have some employee lawyers reluctant even to try. "We will no longer take individual employment-discrimination cases, because there’s such a high likelihood of losing," New York plaintiffs’ attorney Joe Whatley Jr. says. Job-discrimination case filings declined by 40% from 199Source: WSJ.com9 to 2007, federal court records show.

The article also points out that discrimination cases are dismissed more often at the summary judgment stage:

Even the federal courts have detected the pattern of more dismissals in discrimination cases, though they surmise different reasons for it than do plaintiffs’ lawyers. A report last year by the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the federal courts, found that judges nationwide terminated 12.5% of employment-discrimination cases through summary judgments, before the suits reached trial. In 90% of those cases, it was the employers who requested the summary judgment. In contrast, the study found, 3% of contract cases and 1.7% of personal-injury and property-damage suits were dismissed via summary judgments.

There can be a number of reasons for this as the article points out: employers settle bad cases before litigation and employers have implementing better policies and maintain better documentation to defend themselves against discrimination claims.

It is interesting to note that during this same time period that discrimination class are declining, there is a noticeable increased amount of wage and hour litigation. In fact, wage and hour lawsuits more than doubled in federal courts from 2001 to 2006.  No matter what the cause, discrimination cases are harder to bring, and harder to win. What replaced discrimination claims during this same time period? Wage and hour claims for violations of overtime pay, non-payment of wages, and not providing meal and rest breaks. 
 

While California employers anxiously wait for the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Brinker v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) (and also Brinkley v. Public Storage, Inc.), what steps should they in regards to meal and rest break policies?

Record meal breaks.

This is already an obligation of California employers, and the Brinker decision does not change this obligation. Failure to do so creates a negative inference against the employer during litigation.

Employers should continue to have a strict written policy on providing meal and rest breaks.

Brinker’s policies, which were found to be valid by the appellate court, are a good example of policies California employers should have in place. For example, Brinker had a written policy titled “Break and Meal Period Policy for Employees in the State of California.” Brinker also required its employees to sign a form stating “I am entitled to a 30-minute meal period when I work a shift that is over five hours” and that “If I work over 3.5 hours during my shift, I understand that I am eligible for one [10-]minute rest break for each four hours that I work.” Brinker’s policy also stated that an employee’s failure to abide by the policy could result in termination. The court held that this ultimately was sufficient under California law to “provide” meal and rest breaks, only if the defendant has taken steps to establish and communicate the policy. Then if an employee fails to take a meal or rest break voluntarily, the employer is not liable for damages.

Continue to monitor that employees are actually taking meal breaks.

A good example of what not to do was shown by the defendant in Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949. There, the defendant, a trucking company, had computerized systems on each truck that allowed it to track the driver’s location, speed, starts and stops, and time. The drivers had to input factors that the computers could not monitor independently, such as road conditions and traffic. The court held that by requiring its drivers to keep track of these factors, the defendant trucking company regulated the drivers’ activity, but failed to schedule meal breaks, did not include an activity code for meal breaks that would be an acceptable delay for deliveries. The company also did not monitor compliance. The court also noted that:

[W]here the employer has failed to keep records required by statute, the consequences for such failure should fall on the employer, not the employee. In such a situation, imprecise evidence by the employee can provide a sufficient basis for damages.

(citing Hernandez v. Mendoza (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 721, 727). As a result of Cicairos’ failures, “most drivers at their meals while driving or skipped a meal nearly every working day” and the pressure from management made drivers feel that they should not stop for lunch. The court held that these facts negated defendant’s argument that the meal breaks were provided.

Make sure management knows about and enforces these rules.

Employers should have discussions with their front-line managers about meal and rest breaks to ensure that the policy is being effectively administrated.

Policies should require employees to come forward to report if they have been forced to work through a meal break.

This would help to some degree when the employees claim that they were forced to work through their meal and rest breaks.
 

It appears that the California state politicians are close to finalizing a budget deal in Sacramento by this Friday. The Governor placed everything on the table during these negotiations, including attempting to bring some relief to businesses in regards to the meal and rest break laws and even revising California’s requirements that overtime is owed for all work performed over 8 hours in a day. However, by many reports it appears that there will be no change to the current meal and rest break laws, or the overtime requirements.

Many California businesses have been sued in wage and hour class actions alleging that they have not properly administered meal and rest breaks. Employers face large amounts of liability in these class actions in the form of premium pay of one hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of pay for each violation for a period of four years.

The Press Democrat also reports that the deal will increase taxes:

Vehicle license fees would nearly double, going from the current rate of 0.65 percent to 1.15 percent of the value of a car or truck.
The sales tax would increase by 1 cent. Gas taxes would increase by 12 cents a gallon.
Californians would pay a new surcharge on their personal income taxes, amounting to 2.5 percent of their total tax bills. The state’s dependent credit would be cut in half, raising taxes for parents and those who take care of elders.
The new and increased taxes would remain in effect for at least two years.
 

As long as employers are given reasonable advance notice, employees are entitled to take time off to serve as a juror or as a witness if subpoenaed to appear at trial. Employers may not discriminate or otherwise punish an employee for taking time off to serve as a juror or a witness.

Pay During Jury Duty:

Unless a union agreement or contract provides otherwise, you are not required to pay non-exempt employees for time not worked due to jury service. However, due to the prohibition against discrimination against employees who are subpoenaed or called for jury service, employers should have a jury duty policy that is consistent with other policies for taking time off due to non-personal, non-voluntary reasons. In the case of an exempt employee, the employer must continue to pay the full weekly salary unless the jury service prevents the exempt employee from performing any work for a full week.

Many employers voluntarily pay full or half wages for a specified period of time, such as a maximum of two weeks, to employees who are selected to sit on a jury in an effort to raise the quality of juries by expanding the pool of people who are able to serve. As with all policies, whether employers choose to provide paid or unpaid leave, it is important to have a clear policy that is uniformly enforced.