We are nearly at the point were everything we do is recorded.  Think no one knows where you are?  Wrong, your phone’s GPS can be used to track your location without you knowing about it. 

Parties to lawsuits have not realized this new phenomenon either.  In almost every case I have litigated in over the last two years the parties’ emails have played a critical role.  Why is that?  First, almost all communications are done through email.  Email drafted three years ago, and produced in the course of litigation has a lot of credibility because it recorded the facts as they existed at the time the writer sent the email.  It is is very hard to dispute those facts. 

Is This Good Or Bad?

It is good because it is that much easier to catch a lair these days.  It is also bad, because if you do not take the time to accurately draft an email – and your words could have two meanings – it could come back to bite you.  Seth Godin had some good advice today, and provided 8 tips that are well worth a review:

1. Change your settings so that email from you has a name, your name, not a blank or some unusual characters, in the from field. (ask a geek or IT person for help if you don’t know how).
2. Change your settings so that the bottom of every email includes a signature (often called a sig) that includes your name and your organization.
3. Change your settings so that when you reply to a note, the note you’re replying to is included below what you write (this is called quoting).
4. Don’t hit reply all. Just don’t. Okay, you can, but read this first.
5. You can’t recall an email you didn’t mean to send. Some software makes you think you can, but you can’t. Not reliably.
6. Email lives forever, is easy to spread and can easily show up in discovery for a lawsuit.
7. Please don’t ask me to save a tree by not printing your email. It doesn’t work, it just annoys the trees.
8. Send yourself some email at a friend’s computer. Read it. Are the fonts too big or too small? Does it look like a standard email? If it doesn’t look like a standard, does this deviation help you or hurt you? Sometimes, fitting in makes sense, no?

It is also worth remembering how useful email can be as a tool to record facts as they exist on a certain day and time.  It is very easy to send yourself an email to record a discussion that took place – and this email will have a lot of credibility should that discussion ever be the center of lawsuit.

The Department of Labor issued its first “interpretation” letter (a change in policy by the DOL that replaces its opinion letters previously issued) by examining whether or not mortgage loan officers meet the administrative exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The DOL concluded that mortgage loan officer do not meet the exemption, and therefore are owed overtime wages. 

The DOL notes:

The financial services industry assigns a variety of job titles to employees who perform the typical job duties of a mortgage loan officer. Those job titles include mortgage loan representative, mortgage loan consultant, and mortgage loan originator.

The interpretation letter found that the typical mortgage loan officer’s duties begin with obtaining clients, collecting information about the clients (such as income, employment history, investments, and so forth), and then inputting this information into a computer program. The program sets forth appropriate loan products for the clients. The officer would then discuss the different pros and cons for each product with the client in order to match the client’s needs with one of the offered products.

The DOL noted that for the loan officer to qualify as exempt, their primary duty must be “the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers.” Work directly related to management or general business operations consists of work in areas such as accounting, budgeting, quality control, and human resources – not actually producing the product sold by the company or selling the product made by the company.

The DOL interpretation concluded:

Thus, a careful examination of the law as applied to the mortgage loan officers’ duties demonstrates that their primary duty is making sales and, therefore, mortgage loan officers perform the production work of their employers. Work such as collecting financial information from customers, entering it into the computer program to determine what particular loan products might be available to that customer, and explaining the terms of the available options and the pros and cons of each option, so that a sale can be made, constitutes the production work of an employer engaged in selling or brokering mortgage loan products.

This new guidance from the DOL establishes that employers in the financial industry with employees – in particular loan officers – must review this new interpretation and evaluate whether certain employees can simply be paid a salary, or if the employees must be reclassified as non-exempt and receive overtime. The DOL letter can be read here (PDF).

I came across an article recently by Design by Gravity (via Lifehacker) – Methods of Work: It Didn’t Happen If You Didn’t Write It Down – reminding designers and programmers to record their thoughts in some manner, or else lose it forever.  The lesson does not apply just to designers and programmers, but also to HR professionals or anyone else involved in managing employees. 

I have yet to complain about a client involved in an employment lawsuit that the client took too many notes.  The employment lawyer’s mantra is document, document, document.  Why?  Just as the article suggests, if you have a conversation, but do not record the conversation in some manner, it never happened. 

The author suggests a lot different technologies that can help with recording events.  However, I prefer the pen and paper – but I force myself to PDF my notes as soon as possible so that I will never misplace them.  Just had a conversation while you are driving and have another 30 minutes of rush hour traffic to contend with?  In this case, I’ve been using Dragon, a free iPhone app, that transcribes your speech into text that you can either text or email to yourself.  This is a great way to create a time stamped document reflecting what was said.  

Photo by e walk. 

It may come as a surprise to many employers that employees cannot waive, or enter into contracts contrary to many of California’s Labor Code requirements. The rationale for this is pretty basic: if employees could waive the rights given to them under the Labor Code, every employer would simply require the employee to waive the rights on the first day of work, rendering the Labor Code meaningless.

A general rule for Courts is found in Civil Code section 3513, which provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” California courts have found that many of the Labor Code provisions are for the public good, and therefore cannot be waived by an employee.  

Labor Code Provisions An Employee Cannot Waive:

  • Minimum Wage & Overtime

Labor Code Section 1194 provides a private right of action to enforce violations of minimum wage and overtime laws. That statute clearly voids any agreement between an employer and employee to work for less than minimum wage or not to receive overtime:

Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

In Gentry v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court further explained:

[Labor Code] Section 510 provides that nonexempt employees will be paid one and one-half their wages for hours worked in excess of eight per day and 40 per week and twice their wages for work in excess of 12 hours a day or eight hours on the seventh day of work. Section 1194 provides a private right of action to enforce violations of minimum wage and overtime laws.
…
By its terms, the rights to the legal minimum wage and legal overtime compensation conferred by the statute are unwaivable. “Labor Code section 1194 confirms ‘a clear public policy . . . that is specifically directed at the enforcement of California’s minimum wage and overtime laws for the benefit of workers.’”

  • Expense Reimbursement

Labor Code section 2802 requires employers to reimburse its employees for “necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee” while performing his or her job duties. Labor Code section 2804, clearly provides that an employee cannot waive this right to be reimbursed for or liable for the cost of doing business. Section 2804 provides, “Any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this article or any part thereof, is null and void….”

Labor Code Provisions An Employee May Be Able To Waive:

While it is unclear, the following items could possibly be waived by an employee. However, these areas are very unsettled, and employers should approach with caution when seeking waivers from employees on these issues.

  • Meal Breaks

The California Supreme Court is currently reviewing the case Brinker v. Superior Court, that should address, among other issues, the standard regarding how employers need to provide meals breaks. At issue is whether employers need to simply “provide” employees with meal breaks, or on the other hand, “ensure” that employees take meal breaks. If the Supreme Court rules that employers only need to provide meal breaks, then if the employee chooses not to take the meal break, then arguably there would be no violation. The Supreme Court will hopefully issue a ruling on this case in 2010.

  • Waiver To Participate In A Class Action

Given the increase in wage and hour class actions, employers began seeking agreements from their employees that if a dispute would arise about any wage and hour issue, the employee would agree to only seek remedies on an individual basis, not through a class action. The California Supreme Court reviewed the issue if an employee could enter into such an agreement and found that, “at least in some cases, the prohibition of classwide relief would undermine the vindication of the employees’ unwaivable statutory rights and would pose a serious obstacle to the enforcement of the state’s overtime laws.” The Court therefore set out a number of factors that a trial court must look at to determine whether the class action waiver is enforceable or not. As of February 2010, there has not been a class action waiver that has been upheld by an appellate court in California. So while there is the possibility of enforcing such waivers, this possibility is very slight.
 

The case Pellegrino v. Robert Half International, Inc. (RHI) was brought by recruiters alleging that RHI failed to comply with Labor Code provisions pertaining to overtime compensation, commissions, meal periods, itemized wage statements, and unfair competition (under Business and Professions Code section 17200). 

As defenses, RHI argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred because they all entered into agreements that shortened their statute of limitations down from four years to six months. RHI also argued that the Plaintiffs were exempt from wage and hour laws because the employees qualified for the administrative exemption. The appellate court, in agreeing with the lower trial court, dismissed RHI’s defense that the Plaintiffs’ agreed to a shorter statute of limitation on the grounds that this agreement violated public policy and is unenforceable.

The Administrative Exemption

Employers bear the burden to prove that the employee does not qualify for overtime of one and a half times the employee’s regular hourly rate for all work performed over eight hours in one day and/or all hours over 40 in one week. Employees can qualify for a number of different exemptions, and in this case RHI argued that the Plaintiffs were administrative employees.

In order to qualify for the administrative exemption, the court noted that the employer must prove that the employee must:

(1) perform office or non manual work directly related to management policies or general business operations’ of the employer or its customers,

(2) customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment,

(3) perform under only general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training or execute under only general supervision special assignments and tasks,

(4) be engaged in the activities meeting the test for the exemption at least 50 percent of the time, and

(5) earn twice the state’s minimum wage.

The employee must meet all five elements in order to be an exempt administrative employee.

The court explained, by quoting the applicable regulations, that:

“The phrase ‘directly related to management policies or general business operations of his employer or his employer’s customers’ describes those types of activities relating to the administrative operations of a business as distinguished from ‘production’ or, in a retail or service establishment, ‘sales’ work. In addition to describing the types of activities, the phrase limits the exemption to persons who perform work of substantial importance to the management or operation of the business of his employer or his employer’s customers.”

The court found that the evidence did not support RHI’s argument that the Plaintiffs were administrative employees. The court explained that the account executives were trained in sales and evaluated on how well they met sales production numbers – which are not exempt duties. The account executives were also primarily responsible for selling the services of RHI’s temporary employees to its clients. And when they were not selling, they were recruiting more candidates for RHI’s “inventory.” The account executives also followed a “recipe” established by the company which required the employees to rotate their duties ever week between a “sales week,” “desk week,” and recruiting week.” The employees did not develop any policy, but simply followed the company’s system of performing their job. The court finally noted that the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) previously opined that recruiters who worked in a recruiting company did not qualify for the administrative exemption (which can be read at the DLSE’s website here (PDF)). All of these facts supported the trial court’s finding that the employer failed to meet its burden that the account executives were administrative employees.

This case is a good reminder to employers that they must be careful about how employees are classified. Simply because the employee has a high-level title, or every employer in the particular industry has always treated this type of employee as an exempt employee does not mean that the employees are properly classified. Courts will strictly apply the applicable exemption element-by-element to determine whether or not the employer must pay the employee overtime and provide meal and rest breaks. Finally, employers must remember that they will bear the burden of proof when asserting in court that the employee is properly classified as an exempt employee.

The case, Pellegrino v. Robert Half International, Inc. can be downloaded here (PDF).

Despite your teachers, friends, boss, colleagues and family members telling you otherwise, you are a linchpin. You are a genius that can succeed in the new economy. Seth Godin’s new book, Linchpin, sets out to challenge you to unlearn what school and society has rewarded in the past, and to let us all know that we are linchpins (if we make the choice to be).

I just finished reading an advance copy of Linchpin, and have to recommend the book to anyone who either manages people at work or for anyone who has to work for a living. I have read many of Seth’s other books which provide prophetic insight how the Internet and technology have changed marketing and business forever. Linchpin similarly argues that technology is changing the business world dramatically, but the book focuses more on what these changes mean for individuals, and the new opportunities and rewards for those who chose to be linchpins.

What is a linchpin?

The term is defined by the Merriam Webster dictionary as: “(1) a locking pin inserted crosswise (as through the end of an axle or shaft); (2) one that serves to hold together parts or elements that exist or function as a unit <the linchpin in the defense’s case>.” Seth’s theme throughout the book is that a linchpin is an artist who challenges the status quo, and in doing so creates value, and in doing this become indispensible. An artist is not necessarily someone who creates a painting, but Seth says a lawyer, engineer, salesman, politician or a mid-level manager in a large company can all create art. Seth argues that “art is the ability to change people with your work, to see thing as they are and then create stories, images, and interactions that change the marketplace.”

Is it hard to be a linchpin?

Definitely. As Seth observes, “Nothing about becoming indispensable is easy. If it’s easy, it’s already been done and it’s no longer valuable.” But as Seth argues, in today’s world to be “successful” you have no choice but to be a linchpin. Not being a linchpin relegates a worker’s work into a commodity, which makes the worker easily replaceable by the next person who will do the work cheaper.

The book covers the shift in economics that the Internet has developed, which has opened up so much more opportunity. In the past, the bourgeoisie controlled the capital to invest in factories. The proletariat workers had little leverage in the equation because they do not possess the capital to create their own factories. Today, however, “the proletariat own the means of production.”   With the new economy, we have to unlearn the factory mind-set that we have been programmed to live by over the last 100 years – which rewarded showing up for work and following the rules. The Internet has changed this.

While technology has changed the rules of the game, individuals need to make a choice. Society does not reward blind rule-following, but instead requires linchpins who do not have maps telling them what to do next. This is difficult, as we are conditioned by society to follow the status quo and to fit in. Linchpins understand this, and must continually fight off the tendency to give-up, conform and to take the easy path by simply following the rules (Seth refers to this tendency as the resistance).

What does this have to do with employment law?

Well, as a blogger, I have read Seth’s blog for a couple of years.  Before I read the book, I thought it would have no relationship to employment law what-so-ever.  But, only a few pages into the book I realized that this book is a must read for managers and human resource professionals. Companies need to realize they now need linchpins within their organizations, and they need to allow employees room to be linchpins, instead of drowning out these productive individuals by forcing them to conform. Seth notes that “Great bosses and world-class organizations hire motivated people, set high expectations, and give their people room to become remarkable.”  This book is not only a wake-up call to managers about what type of employee is needed in today’s workplace.

Yes, the California Employment Law Report was recognized as a top 100 employment law blog in 2009.  The Delaware Employment Law Blog published its top 100 employment law blogs, and the California Employment Law Report is honored to be recognized in such a distinguished list.   

If you routinely deal with employment law issues across the country, the list of the 100 (plus 10) blogs is a great resource, and you should check the list out here and add a few of the blogs to your RSS reader.

Now all is needed is more time to publish posts to keep this standing in 2010. 

In Roman v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeals upheld an arbitration agreement where the employee challenged the agreement by arguing that the agreement was unenforceable because it only obligated the employee to arbitrate his claims. The court disagreed with plaintiff’s argument and explained that the mere inclusion of the words “I understand” or “I agree” does not destroy the mutuality of an arbitration agreement. Roman v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1473 (2009).

The arbitration agreement at issue in the case provided:

I hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims arising out of the submission of this application. I further agree, in the event that I am hired by the company, that all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal internal resolution which might arise out of my employment with the company, whether during or after that employment, will be submitted to binding arbitration. I agree that such arbitration shall be conducted under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. This application contains the entire agreement between the parties with regard to dispute resolution, and there are no other agreements as to dispute resolution, either oral or written.

Id. at 1467 (citation omitted). The agreement was contained in an employment application and clearly provided: “Please Read Carefully, Initial Each Paragraph and Sign Below.” Plaintiff also initialed next to the paragraph that contained the arbitration agreement. The court found that simply because the agreement in that case was an adhesion contract (or on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis), it still did not render the agreement unenforceable because the agreement was fair. Even though the agreement contained the words “I agree”, this did not render the arbitration agreement to only bind the employee and not the employer to the arbitration agreement.

The Roman court also noted that even if the agreement “were somehow ambiguous on this point, given the public policy favoring arbitration [citation] and the requirement we interpret the provision in a manner that renders it legal rather than void [citation], we would necessarily construe the arbitration agreement as imposing a valid, mutual obligation to arbitrate.” Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1473.  Employers should consider the pros and cons of having employees enter into arbitration agreements, and as this case illustrates, courts are likely to enforce the agreement if it is properly drafted. 

The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, Appellate Court’s opinion in Brinker Restaurant Corporation, et al. v. Hohnbaum, et al. (July 22, 2008) is the opinion that was appealed to the California Supreme Court. The case is one of the first California state appellate court to rule on the parameters of employers’ duties under the California Labor Code requiring rest and meal breaks for hourly employees.  As discussed below, the court’s opinion was across the board in favor for California employers.  The primarily holding by the appellate court was that an employer does not have to “ensure” that meal and rest breaks are taken, therefore making these types of cases very difficult to certify as a class action. 

Due to the monumental impact this case will have on the vast wage and hour litigation in California, this post is longer than we typically like to write.

Case Background

In November 2005 Brinker filed its first petition for writ of mandate (D047509) in this matter. In the petition, Brinker challenged the court’s July 2005 meal period order. Specifically, Brinker requested a writ directing the trial court to "vacate its earlier order holding that: (1) a non-exempt employee is entitled to a meal period for each five-hour block of time worked[; and] (2) the premium pay owed for a violation of [section 226.7] is a wage."

In support of its petition, Brinker argued the trial court erred by interpreting section 512 to mean that an hourly employee’s entitlement to a meal period is "rolling," such that "a separate meal period must be provided for each five-hour block of time worked . . . regardless of the total hours worked in the day. In other words, the [court] interpreted the law to be that . . . [o]nce a meal period concludes, the proverbial clock starts ticking again, and if the employee works five hours more, a second meal period must be provided." 

Brinker also argued that although an employee working more than five hours and less than 10 hours is entitled under section 512 to a 30-minute meal period at some point during the workday, "nothing in [s]ection 512 . . . requires a second meal period be provided solely because [the] employee works five hours after the end of the first meal period, where the total time worked is less than [10] hours." Brinker further asserted that IWC Wage Order No. 5 also "does not dictate the anomalous result that meal periods must be provided every five hours" because, like section 512, it requires only that an employee working more than five hours "gets a meal period at some point during the workday." Brinker complained that the court’s meal period ruling "requires servers to sit down, unpaid, during the most lucrative part of their working day."

Plaintiff’s Motion For Class Certification

Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of "[a]ll present and former employees of [Brinker] who worked at a Brinker[-]owned restaurant in California, holding a non-exempt position, from and after August 16, 2000 (‘Class Members’)." In their moving papers, plaintiffs alternatively defined the class as "all hourly employees of restaurants owned by [Brinker] in California who have not been provided with meal and rest breaks in accordance with California law and who have not been compensated for those missed meal and rest breaks." 

Plaintiffs’ motion also sought certification of six subclasses, three of which are pertinent to the appeal: (1) a "Rest Period Subclass," consisting of "Class Members who worked one or more work periods in excess of three and a half (3.5) hours without receiving a paid 10 minute break during which the Class Member was relieved of all duties, from and after October 1, 2000"; (2) a "Meal Period Subclass," consisting of "Class Members who worked one or more work periods in excess of five (5) consecutive hours, without receiving a thirty (30) minute meal period during which the Class Member was relieved of all duties, from and after October 1, 2000"; and (3) an "Off-The-Clock Subclass," consisting of "Class Members who worked ‘off-the-clock’ or without pay from and after August 16, 2000."

The class in question is estimated to consist of more than 59,000 Brinker employees.

Plaintiffs Rest Break Claims

Plaintiffs allege Brinker willfully violated section 226.7 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 5-1998, 5-2000 and 5-2001 by "fail[ing] to provide rest periods for every four hours or major fraction thereof worked per day to non-exempt employees, and failing to provide compensation for such unprovided rest periods." Section 226.7, subdivision (a) provides: "No employer shall require any employee to work during any meal or rest period mandated by an applicable order of the [IWC]." (Italics added.) 

The pertinent provisions of IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001 are codified in California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 11050, subdivision 12(A), which provides:

Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period. The authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof. However, a rest period need not be authorized for employees whose total daily work time is less than three and one-half (3 1/2) hours. Authorized rest period time shall be counted as hours worked for which there shall be no deduction from wages. (Italics added.)

The court held that the phrase "per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof" does not mean that a rest period must be given every three and one-half hours:

Regulation 11050(12)(A) states that calculation of the appropriate number of rest breaks must "be based on the total hours worked daily." Thus, for example, if one has a work period of seven hours, the employee is entitled to a rest period after four hours of work because he or she has worked a full four hours, not a "major fraction thereof." It is only when an employee is scheduled for a shift that is more than three and one-half hours, but less than four hours, that he or she is entitled to a rest break before the four hour mark. 

Moreover, because the sentence following the "four (4) hours or major fraction thereof" limits required rest breaks to employees who work at least three and one-half hours in one work day, the term "major fraction thereof" can only be interpreted as meaning the time period between three and one-half hours and four hours. Apparently this portion of the wage order was intended to prevent employers from avoiding rest breaks by scheduling work periods slightly less that [sic] four hours, but at the same time made three and one-half hours the cut-off period for work periods below which no rest period need be provided. 

The court also held that the DLSE’s opinion that the term "major fraction thereof" means any time over 50 percent of a four-hour work period is wrong because it renders the current version of Regulation 11050(12)(A) internally inconsistent. As an employee cannot be entitled to a 10-minute break if she or she "works more than 2 . . . hours in a day," if the employee is not entitled to a 10-minute break if he or she works "less than three and one-half" hours in a day. The court also noted that it is not required to follow the DLSE opinion on the matter, citing Murphy v. Kenneth Cole, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1105, fn. 7.

The court also held that the law does not required employers to provide rest breaks before meal breaks:

Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, the provisions of Regulation 11050(12)(A)do not require employers to authorize and permit a first rest break before the first scheduled meal period. Rather, the applicable language of Regulation 11050(12)(A)states only that rest breaks "insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period." (Italics added.) Regulation 11050(12)(A)is silent on the question of whether an employer must permit an hourly employee to take a 10-minute rest break before the first meal period is provided. As Brinker points out, an employee who takes a meal period one hour into an eight-hour shift could still take a post-meal period rest break "in the middle" of the first four-hour work period, in full compliance with the applicable provisions of IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001.

The court explained that Regulation 11050(12)(A) allows employers some “discretion to not have rest periods in the middle of a work period if, because of the nature of the work or the circumstances of a particular employee, it is not ‘practicable.’” In explaining what “practicable” means, the court specifically mentioned that:

…this discretion is of particular importance for jobs, such as in the restaurant industry, that require flexibility in scheduling breaks because the middle of a work period is often during a mealtime rush, when an employee might not want to take a rest break in order to maximize tips and provide optimum service to restaurant patrons. As long as employers make rest breaks available to employees, and strive, where practicable, to schedule them in the middle of the first four-hour work period, employers are in compliance with that portion of Regulation 11050(12)(A). 

Ultimately, the court held that a determination about whether it is practicable to permit rest breaks near the end of a four hour work period is not an issue that can be litigated on a class-wide basis. In overruling the trial court’s granting of class certification the Appellate Court stated:

Had the court properly determined that (1) employees need be afforded only one 10-minute rest break every four hours "or major fraction thereof" (Reg. 11050(12)(A)), (2) rest breaks need be afforded in the middle of that four-hour period only when "practicable," and (3) employers are not required to ensure that employees take the rest breaks properly provided to them in accordance with the provisions of IWC Wage Order No. 5, only individual questions would have remained, and the court in the proper exercise of its legal discretion would have denied class certification with respect to plaintiffs’ rest break claims because the trier of fact cannot determine on a class-wide basis whether members of the proposed class of Brinker employees missed rest breaks as a result of a supervisor’s coercion or the employee’s uncoerced choice to waive such breaks and continue working. Individual questions would also predominate as to whether employees received a full 10-minute rest period, or whether the period was interrupted. The issue of whether rest periods are prohibited or voluntarily declined is by its nature an individual inquiry.

Plaintiffs argued that even if the trial court erred in failing to define the elements of plaintiffs’ rest period claims prior to certifying the class the appellate court should remand the case to the trial court to permit the trial court to rule on if plaintiffs’ "expert statistical and survey evidence" makes their rest break claims amenable to class treatment. The appellate court refused to remand the case, stating that while courts may use such evidence in determining if a claim is amenable to class treatment, here, that evidence does not change the individualized inquiry in determining if Brinker allowed or forbade rest periods. The court stated:

The question of whether employees were forced to forgo rest breaks or voluntarily chose not to take them is a highly individualized inquiry that would result in thousands of mini-trials to determine as to each employee if a particular manager prohibited a full, timely break or if the employee waived it or voluntarily cut it short. (Brown v. Federal Express Corp. (C.D.Cal. 2008) ___ F.R.D. ___ [2008 WL 906517 at *8] (Brown) [meal period violations claim not amenable to class treatment as court would be "mired in over 5000 mini-trials" to determine if such breaks were provided].)

For these reasons, the appellate court vacated the order granting class certification for the rest break subclass. 

Plaintiffs’ Meal Break Claims

In their second cause of action, plaintiffs allege Brinker violated sections 226.7 and 512, and IWC Wage Order No. 5, by failing to "provide meal periods for days on which non-exempt employees work(ed) in excess of five hours, or by failing to provide meal periods [altogether], or to provide second meal periods for days employees worked in excess of [10] hours, and failing to provide compensation for such unprovided or improperly provided meal periods." Plaintiffs claim that Brinker’s “early lunching” policy that required its employees to take their meal periods soon after they arrive for their shifts, usually within the first hour, and then requiring them to work in excess of five hours, and sometimes more than nine hours straight, without an additional meal period violated California law. 

Plaintiffs asserted that common issues predominate on their rest break claims because they "presented corporate policy evidence of a pattern and practice by Brinker of failing to provide a rest period prior to employees’ meal period as a result of its practice of scheduling meals early." Specifically, plaintiffs argued that "Brinker maintains company-wide policies discouraging rest periods, including requiring servers to give up tables and tips if they want a break and failing to provide rest periods prior to scheduled early meals."

1. Rolling five-hour meal period claim

The lower trial court in this case, found that a meal period "must be given before [an] employee’s work period exceeds five hours." The lower court also stated that "the DLSE wants employers to provide employees with break periods and meal periods toward the middle of an employee[‘]s work period in order to break up that employee’s ‘shift.’" The court further stated that Brinker "appears to be in violation of [section] 512 by not providing a ‘meal period’ per every five hours of work."

In overruling the lower court, the appellate court ruled that this interpretation of the law was incorrect and that the trial court’s class certification order rests on improper criteria with respect to the plaintiffs’ rolling five-hour meal period claim.

The appellate court began its analysis with Labor Code Section 512, subdivision (a), which provides:

An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total work period per day of the employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of both the employer and employee. An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.

The appellate court held that Section 512(a) thus provides that an employer in California has a statutory duty to make a first 30-minute meal period available to an hourly employee who is permitted to work more than five hours per day, unless (1) the employee is permitted to work a "total work period per day" that is six hours or less, and (2) both the employee and the employer agree by "mutual consent" to waive the meal period.

The appellate court also held that this interpretation of section 512(a), regarding an employer’s duty to provide a first meal period, is consistent with the plain language set forth in IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001, which provides in part: "No employer shall employ any person for a work period of more than five (5) hours without a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that when a work period of not more than six (6) hours will complete the day’s work the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee."

On the issue regarding when an meal break must be provided the court stated:

With respect to the issue of when an employer must make a first 30-minute meal period available to an hourly employee, Brinker’s uniform meal period policy (titled "Break and Meal Period Policy for Employees in the State of California") comports with the foregoing interpretation of section 512(a) and IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001. It provides that employees are "entitled to a 30-minute meal period" when they "work a shift that is over five hours." 

The court continued in holding that Section 512(a) also provides that an employer has a duty to make a second 30-minute meal period available to an hourly employee who has a "work period of more than 10 hours per day" unless (1) the "total hours" the employee is permitted to work per day is 12 hours or less, (2) both the employee and the employer agree by "mutual consent" to waive the second meal period, and (3) the first meal period "was not waived."

Plaintiffs argue that Brinker’s written meal policy violates section 512(a) and IWC Wage Order No. 5 (specifically, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 11(A)) because it allows the practice of “early lunching” and fails to make a 30-minute meal period available to an hourly employee for every five consecutive hours of work. Plaintiffs maintained that every hourly employee should receive a second meal break five hours after they return from the first meal break. The court found this argument unpersuasive:

Under this interpretation, however, the term "per day" in the first sentence of section 512(a) would be rendered surplusage, as would the phrase "[a]n employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes" in the second sentence of that subdivision.

The appellate court held that without a proper interpretation of section 512(a), the lower court could not correctly ascertain the legal elements that members of the proposed class would have to prove in order to establish their meal period claims, and therefore could not properly determine whether common issues predominate over issues that affect individual members of the class.

2. Brinker’s failure to ensure employees take meal periods

Plaintiffs also claim that Brinker’s uniform meal period policy violates sections 512 and 226.7, as well as IWC Wage Order No. 5, by failing to ensure that its hourly employees take their meal periods. In the primary holding of the case, the appellate court stated:

We conclude that California law provides that Brinker need only provide meal periods, and, as a result, as with the rest period claims, plaintiffs’ meal period claims are not amenable to class treatment.

The appellate court disagreed with Plaintiffs’ contention that an employer’s duty was to ensure a meal break. The court stated:

If this were the case, employers would be forced to police their employees and force them to take meal breaks. With thousands of employees working multiple shifts, this would be an impossible task. If they were unable to do so, employers would have to pay an extra hour of pay any time an employee voluntarily chose not to take a meal period, or to take a shortened one. 

3. Amenability of plaintiffs’ meal break claims to class treatment

The appellate court held that because meal breaks need only be made available, not ensured, individual issues predominate in this case and the meal break claim is not amenable class treatment. The court explained:

The reason meal breaks were not taken can only be decided on a case-by-case basis. It would need to be determined as to each employee whether a missed or shortened meal period was the result of an employee’s personal choice, a manager’s coercion, or, as plaintiffs argue, because the restaurants were so inadequately staffed that employees could not actually take permitted meal breaks. As we discussed, ante, with regard to rest breaks, plaintiffs’ computer and statistical evidence submitted in support of their class certification motion was not only based upon faulty legal assumptions, it also could only show the fact that meal breaks were not taken, or were shortened, not why. It will require an individual inquiry as to all Brinker employees to determine if this was because Brinker failed to make them available, or employees chose not to take them.

The appellate court also found that the evidence does not show that Brinker had a class-wide policy that prohibited meal breaks. Instead, the evidence in this case indicated that some employees took meal breaks and others did not, and it requires the court to perform an individualized inquiring into the reasons why an employee did not take the break. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ statistical and survey evidence does not render the meal break claims one in which common issues predominate because while the time cards might show when meal breaks were taken and when there were not, they cannot show why they were or were not taken.

Plaintiffs’ Off-the clock claim

Plaintiffs also allege Brinker unlawfully required its employees to work off the clock during meal periods. This claim was comprised of two theories: (1) time worked during a meal period when an individual was clocked out; and (2) time “shaving,” which is defined as an unlawful alteration of an employee’s time record to reduce the time logged so as to not accurately reflect time worked.

The court held, and the Plaintiffs did not dispute, that employers can only be held liable for off-the-clock claims if the employer knows or should have known the employee was working off the clock. (citing Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th at p. 585.) The evidence also established that Brinker has a written corporate policy prohibiting off-the-clock work. Because of these facts, the court found that plaintiffs’ off-the-clock claims are not amenable to class treatment. As the court stated:

Thus, resolution of these claims would require individual inquiries in to whether any employee actually worked off the clock, whether managers had actual or constructive knowledge of such work and whether managers coerced or encouraged such work. Indeed, not all the employee declarations alleged they were forced to work off the clock, demonstrating there was no class-wide policy forcing employees to do so.