Welcome to another Friday’s Five video.  In this video I discuss five things every California employer needs to know about meal and rest breaks.  The items consists of a some reminders, but also new court decisions issued in December 2016 and the first quarter of 2017.  This is always a topic employers need to continually pay attention to in California.

Here are links to articles I’ve published as referenced in the video:
Timing requirements for meal and rest breaks

Rest break requirements when employees still subject to recall by employer

Commissioned and piece rate employees must be compensated separately for rest breaks

Happy Friday.  As always, please let me know if you have any suggestions for topics for future posts.

Often the threat of the plaintiff’s potential ability to recover attorney’s fees is greater than the actual damages that they can prove.  This can be frustrating for employers defending wage and hour claims, in both the individual and class action context.  Indeed, an employer must understand the potential damages and exposure of fees they may have to pay if a case proceeds to trial or arbitration, as well as the potential to recover fees against the plaintiff.  This Friday’s Five addresses common attorney’s fees issues facing employers in wage and hour litigation.

1. When are attorney’s fees recoverable in wage and hour cases?  And can a defendant recover fees if they prevail? 

 Attorney’s fees in wage-and-hour cases are covered by two sections of the Labor Code:  sections 218.5 and 1194.  Aleman v. AirTouch Cell., 209 Cal. App. 4th 556, 579 (2012).  “Sections 218.5 and 1194 cover similar, though functionally exclusive subjects.”  Id.  Section 218.5 covers, among other things, claims “for the nonpayment of wages,” except those claims subject to Section 1194.  Section 1194, in turn, covers claims for failure to pay minimum wage or overtime.  Fees are assessed on a claim-by-claim basis.  Id. at 584.

Section 218.5 allows for “two-way” fee shifting – i.e., to the prevailing party, whether employee or employer – while Section 1194 only permits a prevailing employee to recover fees.  Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1248 (2012).  For an employer to recover fees under Section 218.5, the claim must have been made in “bad faith.”  Cal. Lab. Code § 218.5(a).

 2. Attorney’s fees are not available to plaintiff for prevailing on missed meal or rest break claims.

 In Kirby, the California Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a can a party recover fees and costs under Labor Code, section 218.5 or 1194 when it prevails only on a claim for meal or rest break premium pay.  The court determined that neither of these sections allow for fees, and neither party can recover fees based on a claim only for premium pay.  Id. at 1251-59.

First, the court held that by its plain terms, section 1194 applies only to claims within the usual meaning of minimum wage and overtime – i.e., failure to pay the minimum wage or overtime compensation set by statute.  Id. at 1251-55.

Second, the court found section 218.5 inapplicable because it only applies to claims for “nonpayment of wages.”  Id. at 1255-57.  The court noted that the basis of a section 226.7 claim is the failure to provide meal or rest breaks, rather than the non-payment of wages.  Id. at 1256-57 (“Nonpayment of wages is not the gravamen of a 226.7 violation.  Instead . . . section 226.7 defines a legal violation solely by reference to an employer’s obligation to provide meal and rest breaks.”)  Accordingly, while premium pay owed for missed meal or rest breaks is measured in terms of an hour’s pay, and deemed a “wage” for other purposes (such as the statute of limitations) this is only the statutory remedy.  Id.  The injury is not a failure to provide premium pay, but the failure to provide breaks, and therefore a prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees under these provisions.

3. An employee cannot recover attorney’s fees for successfully winning waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203. 

 In Ling v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1260-61 (2016), the court considered the issue where a plaintiff arbitrated her claims before JAMS and the arbitrator rejected plaintiffs’ primary theory of misclassification.  Id. at 1248-49.  Instead, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff $1,038 in break premium for her nine-week training period, which “received little attention at the hearing,” was raised by plaintiff only in post-hearing briefing, and where it was largely undisputed that the plaintiff was entitled to breaks.  Id. at 1248.  The arbitrator awarded $7,688 in waiting time penalties under section 203Id.

Among many other issues on appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the arbitrator erred in failing to award her attorneys fees on her successful claim under Labor Code section 203.  The Court of Appeal disagreed.  It noted that employee could not “transmute” a claim for missed breaks into one for unpaid wages by bringing a derivative claim for waiting time penalties.  Id. at 1261.  Just as under Kirby, while waiting time penalties are measured in wages, those penalties are—as Section 203 states expressly—“penalties” and not wages.  Accordingly, the court found that waiting time penalties should not have been awarded.  Id.  More importantly, however, the court further concluded that no fees could be awarded, because the waiting time claim was “purely derivative” of a claim for meal break premium pay.  Because the underlying claim did not involve a failure to pay earned wages, the court held that the waiting time claim did not either, so could not support a claim for fees on either side.  (Id. [“Because a section 203 claim is purely derivative of ‘an action for the wages from which the penalties arise,’ it cannot be the basis of a fee award when the underlying claim is not an action for wages.”])

4. Which party is entitled to fees is the verdict a split decision and the plaintiff does not win all of their claims? 

Where neither party secures a “complete, unqualified victory” on all claims, “it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine which party prevailed . . . or whether, on balance, neither party prevailed sufficiently to justify an award of attorney fees.”  (See Scott Co. of California v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1109.)  In exercising this discretion, the court is to “compare the relief awarded . . . with the parties’ demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources.”  (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 863, 876.)  This rule applies where both parties effectively win on some claims but not others, including the Labor Code context.  (On-Line Power, Inc. v. Mazur (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1087 [noting that where plaintiff brought action for breach of contract and Labor Code violations, and settled for $25,000 pursuant to statutory offer, it was the type of case where the court had discretion to determine the prevailing party].)

5. Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees may be denied if plaintiff recovers less than $25,000 in damages.

When a plaintiff recovers less than the jurisdictional threshold for limited civil cases, which is set at $25,000 – the court has discretion to deny fees outright, or to award only limited fees.  (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.)  This rule applies even where a statute expressly provides for fee shifting.  (See Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 986-87 [reversing and upholding trial court’s ruling denying plaintiff any fees where plaintiff recovered only $11,500 in unlimited civil case].)  Section 1033 applies where “the plaintiff did not bring the action as a limited civil case and thus did not take advantage of the cost- and time-saving advantages of limited civil case procedures.”  (Id. at p. 982).  If a plaintiff only proves limited damages at trial or in arbitration, this rule can shield defendants from being liable of potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars for fees incurred by plaintiff’s counsel.

Expense reimbursement may seem like a small issue in comparison with the other areas of liability facing California employers, but the exposure for not appropriately reimbursing employees can be substantial. In Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., the California Supreme Court clarified the parameters of mileage reimbursement under California law, as well as the three different methods available for employers to reimburse employees for their mileage reimbursement.  This post discusses five issues employers need to know about automobile and mileage reimbursement under California law.

1. Mileage reimbursement based on IRS mileage rate is presumed to reimburse employee for all actual expenses

The IRS publishes standard mileage rates each year (and sometimes adjusts these rates during the year). The 2014 mileage rate is published on the IRS mileage rate here.

If the employee challenges the amount reimbursed, the employee bears the burden to show how the “amount that the employer has paid is less than the actual expenses that the employee has necessarily incurred for work-required automobile use (as calculated using the actual expense method), the employer must make up the difference.” Gattuso, at 479.

The California Supreme Court also held that the reimbursement rate can be negotiated by parties as long as it fully reimburses the employee, and the amount does not have to be set at the IRS mileage rate. The Court also warned that employee cannot waive the right to be fully reimbursed for their actual expenses:

We agree that, as with other terms and conditions of employment, a mileage rate for automobile expense reimbursement may be a subject of negotiation and agreement between employer and employee. Under section 2804, however, any agreement made by the employee is null and void insofar as it waives the employee’s rights to full expense reimbursement under section 2802.

Gattuso, at 479.

2. Reimbursement Method: Actual Expense Method

In examining the different methods of reimbursement, the Supreme Court held that the actual expense method is the most accurate, but it is also the most burdensome for both the employer and the employee. Gattuso, at 478. Under the actual expense method, the parties calculate the automobile expenses that the employee actually and necessarily incurred and then the employer separately pays the employee that amount. The actual expenses of using an employee’s personal automobile for business purposes include: fuel, maintenance, repairs, insurance, registration, and depreciation.

3. Reimbursement Method: Mileage Reimbursement Method

The Court recognized that employers may simplify calculating the amount owed to an employee by paying an amount based on a “total mileage driven." Gattuso, at 479.

Under the mileage reimbursement method, the employee only needs to keep a record of the number of miles driven for job duties. The employer then multiplies the miles driven by a predetermined amount that approximates the per-mile cost of owning and operating an automobile. The Court recognized that the mileage rate agreed to between the employer and employee is “merely an approximation of actual expenses” and is less accurate than the actual expense method. It is important to note that while this amount can be negotiated, the employee still is unable to waive their right to reimbursement of their actual costs as mentioned above.

4. Reimbursement Method: Lump Sum Payment

Under the lump sum method, the employee need not submit any information to the employer about work-required miles driven or automobile expenses incurred. The employer merely pays an agreed upon fixed amount for automobile expense reimbursement. Gattuso, at 480. This type of lump sum payment is often labeled as a per diem, car allowance, or gas stipend.

In Gattuso, the Court made it clear that employers paying a lump sum amount have the extra burden of separately identifying and documenting the amounts that represent payment for labor performed and the amounts that represent reimbursement for business expenses.

5. All expenses incurred in an employee’s course and scope of their job must be reimbursed by the employer.

In addition to mileage, employers may also have to reimburse employees for other costs they incurred in driving their personal cars for business. In making the determination about whether an employee’s actions are in the “course and scope” of their job, courts examine whether the expense being sought by the employee is “not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include loss or expense among other costs of the employer’s business.” This is a very fact specific determination that employers need to approach with caution.

Generally, employees have a privacy expectation in their personnel files, contact information, and work related information. However, this expectation of privacy is not limitless, especially when the employee publically airs his or her work experiences on social media sites for the public to see. Courts have held that employees can waive this right to privacy once they make disclosures in public for everyone else to read via social media networks.

For example, in a case not in the employment context, a California court reviewed the issue of whether an author who posts an article on myspace.com can state a cause of action for invasion of privacy and for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a person who submits that article to a newspaper for republication. The case, Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc. involved a college student who had moved away from her home town of Coalinga, California. She wrote “An ode to Coalinga” and posted it on her site on MySpace.com. The ode badmouthed her hometown. Six days after publishing it on MySpace, she took the writing off of the site, but the town’s high school principal submitted the writing to the local newspaper for publication. The newspaper republished the ode in the letters to the editor section and listed Moreno’s full name even though she only used her first name on her MySpace page. The ode must have contained some serious dirt on the city, as it resulted in death threats against Moreno’s family, and eventually forced her family to close a 20 year old business and move out of town.

Moreno sued for invasion of her privacy alleging that her post on MySpace was only supposed to be viewed by a few of her friends, and because she removed the post six days after publishing the article. The court rejected Moreno’s theory that the newspaper’s publication violated her right to privacy because her post to MySpace was made virtually to everyone with an Internet connection. The Court reasoned that, “[Moreno’s] affirmative act made her article available to any person with a computer and thus opened it to the public eye. Under these circumstances, no reasonable person would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published material. As pointed out by appellants, to be a private fact, the expectation of privacy need not be absolute.” Therefore, the court held that “the fact [Moreno] expected a limited audience does not change the above analysis. By posting the article on myspace.com, [Moreno] opened the article to the public at large. Her potential audience was vast.” The court concluded that Moreno therefore could not asserted a cause of action for invasion of her right to privacy against the newspaper.

Even though this case is not involving employment information, a similar analysis would apply to an employee who posts information on social media about workplace issues. Once the employee places the information about his or her work circumstances on social media, this greatly reduces the employee’s privacy in the subject matter. However, an employer should be cautious, and use common sense in responding to such posts. For example, if an employee posts negative information about the company on social media, it would obviously not give the employer a right to disclose the employee’s health information and documents from the employee’s personnel file. Alternatively, if the employee posts about how bad an employer treated him or her, the employer would have the right to publically set the record straight with facts specific to rebut the allegations made by the employee.

Employers should use common sense in responding publically to an employee’s or former employee’s posts on social media and keep any discussions limited to the facts and issues raised by the employee. Furthermore, employers should approach situations with caution when an employee’s posts on social media are password protected and only friends of the employee can view the post. Hacking or gaining access to social media posts under false pretenses is most likely illegal, and would tilt the analysis back into the employee’s favor that the information was not disclosed to everyone and, therefore, would be considered private. In addition, employers may never retaliate against employees for making complaints via the internet or otherwise, and should be careful in making employment decisions based on employees’ complaints about workplace issues even if made on the Internet.

An employer is not required to allow employees to use medical marijuana as a reasonable accommodation under California’s Fair Employment Housing Act (FEHA). The California Supreme Court held that it is not a violation of California law for an employer to terminate an employee who tests positive for marijuana, even though the employee was prescribed the marijuana for medical purposes under California’ Compassionate Use Act of 1996.

The case, Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc., addressed the conflict between California’s Compassionate Use Act, (which gives a person who uses marijuana for medical purposes on a physician’s recommendation a defense to certain state criminal charges and permission to possess the drug) and Federal law (which prohibits the drug’s possession, even by medical users). Ragingwire terminated plaintiff’s employment based on a positive test for marijuana even through the plaintiff provided a doctor’s note explaining that he was prescribed marijuana to alleviate back pains.

The Supreme Court explained that the employer’s decision to terminate plaintiff was not illegal:

Nothing in the text or history of the Compassionate Use Act suggests the voters intended the measure to address the respective rights and duties of employers and employees. Under California law, an employer may require preemployment drug tests and take illegal drug use into consideration in making employment decisions. (Loder v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846, 882-883.)

Plaintiff’s position might have merit if the Compassionate Use Act gave marijuana the same status as any legal prescription drug. But the act’s effect is not so broad. No state law could completely legalize marijuana for medical purposes because the drug remains illegal under federal law (21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844(a)), even for medical users (see Gonzales v. Raich, supra, 545 U.S. 1, 26-29; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, supra, 532 U.S. 483, 491-495). Instead of attempting the impossible, as we shall explain, California’s voters merely exempted medical users and their primary caregivers from criminal liability under two specifically designated state statutes. Nothing in the text or history of the Compassionate Use Act suggests the voters intended the measure to address the respective rights and obligations of employers and employees.

The Court also provided that a reasonable accommodation, as required under California’s FEHA, does not include an employer’s permission to use illegal drugs:

The FEHA does not require employers to accommodate the use of illegal drugs. The point is perhaps too obvious to have generated appellate litigation, but we recognized it implicitly in Loder v. City of Glendale, supra, 14 Cal.4th 846 (Loder). Among the questions before us in Loder was whether an employer could require prospective employees to undergo testing for illegal drugs and alcohol, and whether the employer could have access to the test results, without violating California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code, § 56 et seq.). We determined that an employer could lawfully do both. In reaching this conclusion, we relied on a regulation adopted under the authority of the FEHA (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7294.0, subd. (d); see Gov. Code, § 12935, subd. (a)) that permits an employer to condition an offer of employment on the results of a medical examination. (Loder, at p. 865; see also id. at pp. 861-862.) We held that such an examination may include drug testing and, in so holding, necessarily recognized that employers may deny employment to persons who test positive for illegal drugs. The employer, we explained, was “seeking information that [was] relevant to its hiring decision and that it legitimately may ascertain.” (Id. at p. 883, fn. 15.) We determined the employer’s interest was legitimate “[i]n light of the well-documented problems that are associated with the abuse of drugs and alcohol by employees — increased absenteeism, diminished productivity, greater health costs, increased safety problems and potential liability to third parties, and more frequent turnover . . . .” (Id. at p. 882, fn. omitted.) We also noted that the plaintiff in that case had “cite[d] no authority indicating that an employer may not reject a job applicant if it lawfully discovers that the applicant currently is using illegal drugs or engaging in excessive consumption of alcohol.” (Id. at p. 883, fn. 15.) The employer’s legitimate concern about the use of illegal drugs also led us in Loder to reject the claim that preemployment drug testing violated job applicants’ state constitutional right to privacy. (Id. at pp. 887-898; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)

(footnote omitted).

The plaintiff also alleged a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Generally, at-will employees can terminate or be terminated from their job at any time, but an employer cannot terminate an employee for reasons that violate a fundamental public policy of the state. The Court rejected plaintiff’s position that there was a fundamental public policy that permitted him to use medical marijuana and be under its influence while at work. The Court stated, “Nothing in the [Compassionate Use Act’s] text or history indicates the voters intended to articulate any policy concerning marijuana in the employment context, let alone a fundamental public policy requiring employers to accommodate marijuana use by employees."

A further clarification that medical marijuana use is not protected under disability laws came in 2012 from a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that held individuals seeking to stop cities from closing medical marijuana dispensaries under Title II of the ADA were not protected by under the ADA.  The case is James v. City of Costa Mesa, which held that the ADA does not protect against discrimination on the basis of marijuana use, even though permitted under certain circumstances under California law, marijuana use is not authorized by federal law, and therefore is not protected under the ADA. It is therefore likely that a court would also recognize that a patron does not have a right under Title III of the ADA, which applies to public accommodations, to use medical marijuana in public establishments, like restaurants.

The judgment against the defendant for $1,347,000 in Faigin v. Signature Group Holdings, Inc. should be a good reminder for companies to have well drafted executive agreements. Faigin worked as General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer for Fremont General, a parent corporation. Defendant had various subsidiary companies that Faigin also worked for during his employment. Faigin entered into an employment contract with Fremont General. The agreement set forth that Faigin would be entitled to certain benefits if he was involved in an “involuntary termination.” If he was involuntarily terminated, as defined in the agreement, the company agreed to pay Faigin a lump sum equal to three years of his base salary.

After entering into the agreement with Fremont General, Faigin was appointed to interim President and Chief Executive Officer of FRC, a subsidiary of Fremont General. A short time after assuming these roles, Faigain was replaced at FRC. Faigin argued that his dismissal from his roles at FRC resulted in an involuntary termination under the term of his employment contract, entitling him to three years of his salary which exceeded $400,000 per year.

At trial, FRC argued that the employment agreement entered into with Fremont General did not apply to the situation arising out of Faigin’s employment with FRC because the agreement was only entered into with Fremont General, not FRC. The trial court agreed, and excluded any evidence of the employment agreement between Faigin and Fremont General. However, Faigin presented evidence that FRC created an implied-in-fact employment contract that he would only be terminated for good cause. As the court noted, an implied-in-fact employment contract can be established by showing the following:

The existence and content of such an agreement are determined from the totality of the circumstances, including the employer’s personnel policies and practices, the employee’s length of service, actions and communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and practices in the relevant industry. The question whether such an implied-in-fact agreement exists is a factual question for the trier of fact unless the undisputed facts can support only one reasonable conclusion.

An implied-in-fact agreement to terminate only for good cause cannot arise if there is an express writing to the contrary, such as a written acknowledgement that employment is at will or an at-will provision in a written employment agreement. “There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results. [Citations.]”

(Citations omitted). The court stated that because the employment agreement with Fremont General fixed the term of employment at three years and did not provide that Faigin’s employment was at-will, this written agreement is not inconsistent with the jury’s finding of an implied-in-fact agreement existed.

The case shows how careful employers need to be in drafting executive compensation agreements, and especially if the executive is working for different subsidiaries of a parent company.

Given the increasing mobility of the workforce, the issue of which state’s laws apply to a traveling employee is becoming more and more common. In Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., the California Supreme Court held that California-based employers must pay non-resident employees working in California according to the California’s overtime laws. That means that a California employer who has employees travel to California to work must pay the employees according to California’s wage and hour laws – not pursuant to the laws from the state that the employee is from. The Court emphasized California’s strong public policies in place to protect the employees.

This holding was again recognized in See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court. The Court in See’s Candy stated, “We agree with [the Plaintiff] that under Sullivan a California employer generally must pay all employees, including nonresident employees working in California, state overtime wages unless the employee is exempt.” While the issue in See’s Candy was whether an employer’s time-keeping rounding policy complied with California law, the case is a good reminder that the analysis of which state’s employment laws apply to employees is simply more than looking up where the employee live.

In See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court the court addressed whether an employer’s policy of rounding  employee’s time clock entries to the nearest tenth of an hour.  See’s Candy’s policy rounded employees’ time entries either up or down to the nearest tenth of an hour in its Kronos time keeping system. For example, if an employee clocked in at 7:58 a.m., the system rounds the time to 8:00 a.m., and if the employee clocked in at 8:02 a.m., the system rounds down the entry to 8:00 a.m.

Plaintiffs challenged this rounding policy by arguing that this policy prevented employees from receiving all of their wages twice a month as required by California law. The court noted that even though California employers “have long engaged in employee time-rounding, there is no California statue or case law specifically authorizing or prohibiting this practice.” See’s Candy argued that given this lack of clear authority on the issue, courts should adopt the federal standard, which is also used by California’s Division Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”), which allows rounding.

The court agreed that time entry rounding is permissible under California law:

Relying on the DOL rounding standard, we have concluded that the rule in California is that an employer is entitled to use the nearest-tenth rounding policy if the rounding policy is fair and neutral on its face and ‘it is used in such a manner that it will not result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually worked.’ (29 C.F.R. § 785.48; see DLSE Manual, supra, §§ 47.1, 47.2.)

See’s Candy presented evidence that across all of its employees the rounding policy actually resulted in a total gain of 2,749 hours for the class of employees involved in the litigation. Therefore, the court held that the rounding policy that rounded both up and down from the midpoint of every six minutes did not result in a loss to the employees.

It is important to note the limitation of this holding. This case involved clear evidence, presented in the form of an expert witness, establishing the effect on the total time paid to the employees did not result in a loss to the employees. Also, the rounding policy would round both up and down. Had the policy only rounded in favor of the employer, that would have violating the rule established in this case. Employers utilizing rounding for payroll must still do so with caution. For example, there should be periodic audits to ensure the effect of rounding does not favor the employer over a period of time. The opinion can be read here: See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court.

 A split shift is defined in the California IWC Wage Orders as:

…a work schedule, which is interrupted by non-paid non-working periods established by the employer, other than bona fide rest or meal periods.

See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11040, subd. 2(Q). If the employee works two shifts separated by more than a rest or meal period, they are entitled to receive one hour’s of pay at the minimum wage rate in addition to the minimum wage for that work day. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §11040, subd. 4(C). Any additional amounts over minimum wage paid to the employee can be used to offset the split shift pay due to an employee. For example, say an employee earns $10 per hour. She works 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., and then again from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. This is a total of eight hours worked for the day, and she is entitled to a split shift payment of one hour at $8 (minimum wage). However, because she earned $16 over minimum wage ($2 above minimum wage x 8 hours = $16) for the eight hours of work, this amount can be used to offset the amount owed for the split shift pay. Therefore there is nothing owed to the employee in this example.  

A court clarified some aspects of split shift pay last year in the case Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court. In that case, the plaintiffs were security guards that worked the graveyard shift. Securitas designated its workday as beginning at midnight and ending the following midnight. This resulted in the guards working shifts that started on one day, and then ended on the next working day. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to split shift pay because their shift ended in the morning, and then they were required to start a new shift several hours later in that same day. The Court ruled against the Plaintiffs and held that employees are not entitled to split shift pay when they work uninterrupted overnight shifts. In this case, there was no “split” in the shift. The court explained:

A "split shift" occurs only when an employee’s designated working hours are interrupted by one or more unpaid, nonworking periods established by the employer that are not bona fide rest or meal periods. The fact that a single continuous shift happens to begin during one "workday" and end in another does not result in a "split shift."

However, the case left open the question of how long between shifts would constitute a split shift. For example, can an employee take a two hour lunch period without obligating the employer to pay the split shift pay? Until courts clarify this issue, conservative employers limit the meal periods to one hour.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently held in D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184, that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement was unenforceable as it violates employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Specifically, it held that employees have “the right ‘to engage in…concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection…” under section 7 of the NLRA and therefore any waiver to participate in class actions violates this right.

However, since the D.R. Horton decision courts have upheld class action waivers in the employment context and have rejected the NLRB’s reasoning in D.R. Horton as inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, which permitted class action waivers in arbitration agreements. For example, in LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.), the plaintiff brought a putative class action alleging various wage and hour violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York labor laws. In rejecting the reasoning of D.R. Horton, the court held that:

Given that the Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility that ‘[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA,’ this Court must read AT&T Mobility as standing against any argument that an absolute right to collective action is consistent with the FAA’s ‘overarching purpose’ of ‘ensur[ing] the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings. To the extent that [plaintiff] relies…on the recent decision of the National Labor Relations Board (‘NLRB’) in D.R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, Case 12-CA-25764, January 2, 2012, as authority to support a conflicting reading of AT&T Mobility, this Court declines to follow [that] decision[].

As I’ve written about previously, this area of the law is quickly changing. There is no doubt that new decisions this year will continue to add to the development of this area of the law.