1. Not drafting job descriptions because the employer believes that they are either useless or are not needed in small to medium sized companies. 
  2. Not listing the essential functions of the job (i.e., the primary purpose the job exists).
  3. Listing functions that are not the essential functions of the job as essential functions. Employers should separate these “other” functions as just that. Employers should also have language that specifies that the job may change, and employees may be required to perform other duties as required.
  4. Using legalese. Employers should use concrete terms that everyone can understand.
  5. Making the description too long.
  6. Using terms and/or abbreviations that only others in the company understand what they mean.
  7. Not updating job descriptions and simply use the ones drafted in 1990. Times are changing very fast, and an employer’s expectations of its employees in 1990 are probably vastly different than compared to 2009.
  8. Containing typos and poor grammar. A job description may be the critical document in employment litigation, a judge and/or jury may have to interpret the meaning of the job description, and therefore it is important to take time and care in drafting the language of the job description.
  9. Not referring to the job descriptions when conducting employee performance reviews or when addressing its liability against a potential ADA lawsuit.
  10. Not having outside legal counsel review the job descriptions (come on, you knew I had to put this one in).

Plaintiffs Hernandez and Lopez were employed by Hillsides Children Center, Inc., which provided services to children with special needs and who were abused. Hillsides discovered that someone was accessing pornographic websites on a computer located in the Plaintiffs’ office late in the evening.

The employer, citing its mission to protect abused children and to protect itself from any legal liability, installed a video camera in Plaintiffs’ office to identify the perpetrator. Because the websites were only being access at night, the video camera did not record any of Plaintiffs’ activities during the day, and was only turned on at night. The perpetrator was not caught.  But Plaintiffs’ discovered the video camera in the office, and filed this lawsuit for violation of their privacy rights.

The California Supreme Court noted that to succeed on their privacy claims, Plaintiffs would need to prove that:

  1. The plaintiff must possess a legally protected privacy interest,
  2. The plaintiff’s expectations of privacy must be reasonable, and
  3. The plaintiff must show that the intrusion is so serious in nature, scope, and actual or potential impact as to constitute an egregious breach of social norms.

The Court noted that Plaintiffs were able to establish violation of the first two elements in this case– that the employer intentionally intruded into the Plaintiffs’ office in which they had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Offensiveness of the employer’s action

However, the Court held that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof for the third element. First, the Court held that the degree and setting of the intrusion into Plaintiffs’ privacy was not very high. The Court noted that the “place, time, and scope” of defendant’s surveillance was not highly offensive. Second, the Court looked at the employers motive and justifications for conducting the surveillance – which had no element of being improper in this case. Given nature Hillsides’ business of helping abused children, it was taking proper action to prevent any possible harm to them. Given these factors, the Court found that the Plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, prove that a reasonable person would find the intrusion into their privacy offensive.

Take away for employers

  • Do not assume that you have the right to monitor employees during working hours. As the case establishes, employees still have reasonable expectations of privacy at work.
  • Do not assume a computer monitoring policy applies to video and audio surveillance. The employer in this case tried to argue that the computer monitoring policy diminished Plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy at work, but the Court disagreed because the policy never mentioned the possibility that employees could be videotaped at work.

The case, Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. can be read here.

The Federal minimum wage increased to $7.25 per hour on July 24, 2009. However, because California’s minimum wage is $8.00 per hour, the increase in the Federal minimum wage does not affect California employers, as employers need to pay the higher of the two minimum wages.  Here is an interesting table of the history of California’s minimum wage amounts. 

Other notes about California minimum wage:

  • There is no tip credit allowed in California for tipped employees. Employers still must pay $8.00 per hour even for employees who receive tips while working.  Click here for a list of states that do recognize a tip credit. 
  • Employees cannot not waive their right to receive minimum wage (see Labor Code section 1194(a)).
  • There are a very limited number of employees who are exempt from minimum wages, such as outside salespersons or family members of the employer.
  • If an employee prevails in a lawsuit for unpaid minimum wages, he or she is also entitled to attorney’s fees as costs of the suit under Labor Code section 1194(a) (which, often times are larger than the minimum wage amounts not paid in the first place). 
     

The line between when employees are on or off the clock have become more and more grey with the advent of Blackberries, iPhones, and providing employees with remote login access from their homes. On-call time is considered compensable work time if it is spent primarily for the benefit of the employer and its business. In making this determination, the on call waiting time is spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit depends on two considerations: (1) the parties’ agreement, and (2) the degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal activities.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Owens v. Local No. 169, Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers (9th Cir. 1992) 971 F.2d 347, 350-355, provided a nonexclusive list of factors courts would examining in determining whether the employee was free to engage in personal activities (note that none of the factors is determinative by itself):

  1. whether there was an on premises living requirement;
  2. whether there were excessive geographical restrictions on employee’s movements;
  3. whether the frequency of calls was unduly restrictive;
  4. whether a fixed time limit for response was unduly restrictive;
  5. whether the on-call employee could easily trade on-call responsibilities;
  6. whether use of a pager could ease restrictions; and
  7. whether the employee had actually engaged in personal activities during call-in time.

In addition, the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement published this guideline on call back time and stand by time. Employers need to conduct a review of each case when on-call time may be an issue in order to determine whether pay is owed.
 

A Florida city revised its dress code last week to require that employees wear underwear to work. The dress code also prohibits provocative clothing, halter tops and piercings other than in the employees’ ears. I was asked to speak on the subject of dress codes about two weeks ago. The timing was just a bit too late, and I missed this great illustration.

The story gets even better. The mayor of Brooksville cast the only opposing vote to implementing the new dress code, citing that a mandate to wear underwear “takes away freedom of choice.” This gives a new meaning to the term “pro-choice."

So is the city’s “pro-underwear” position legal?

Probably. Employers can generally set dress code standards for their employees as long as the policies do not discriminate on the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, or any other protected status.

If the dress code conflicts with an employee’s religion, an employer may have to analyze whether there is a reasonable accommodation that it can provide to the employee. In the context of providing an employee a reasonable accommodation for dress issues, the US Supreme Court noted that in the context of religion accommodations, employers do not have to provide accommodations that are more than a “de minimis” cost. See TWA v. Hardison 432 U.S. 63 (1977).

Employers also have to be aware of obscure state and local laws that may also prohibit employers from implementing other prohibitions. For example, here in California, the Government Code specifically addresses employees’ right to wear pants to work. Section 12947.5 states:

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to permit an employee to wear pants on account of the sex of the employee.
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer from requiring employees in a particular occupation to wear a uniform.
 

While there are some laughs at the Florida city’s expense, employers do need to pay close attention to their dress code policies to ensure that they are compliant.  Employers also need to ensure that HR is properly trained to deal with complaints and requests for reasonable accommodations when they arise.

The City of Bozeman, Montana asked job applicants to provide their user names and login information to common social networking sites on their job applications. As you may expect, this has caused a major uproar from privacy groups.

Just over one-year ago, I was asked by employers about what legalities were involved in Googling a job applicant, or looking at their on-line presence before making a hiring decision. It seems now, however, that once employees realized that their on-line presence is not so private, they began to restrict who could view this information on the Internet.

The city of Bozeman apparently was not happy with the increasing sophistication of people posting information on the Internet, resulting in it being shutout of viewing job applicants’ Facebook pages. So the city simply started to ask job applicants to provide their user names and passwords to social networking sites. The application provides:

Please list any and all current personal or business Web sites, web pages or memberships on any Internet-based chat rooms, social clubs or forums, to include, but not limited to: Facebook, Google, Yahoo, YouTube.com, MySpace, etc.

Many people and groups, such as the ACLU, have objected to this request arguing that it violates the job applicants’ privacy rights. As a result of the criticism it received, the city said that it will likely remove the request for user names and passwords, but may still require job applicants to “friend” the city in Facebook so that the city could still see what is posted.

I think this policy goes too far. Irrespective of the legal privacy questions raised, I do not think it would be a good hiring practice for an employer. I, for one, (and I think a lot of other people) would simply refuse to provide this information. If the city disqualifies job applicants who do not provide the information (which is claims it does not do), it is limiting its potential workforce of qualified people. Employees using these technologies are computer savy and are at least motivated enough to learn and try new technology. The job applicants who most likely will not have a problem in providing this information are those who do not know how to use a computer or the Internet and do not have any social networking accounts. Are these really the best qualified employees? In today’s workforce, a working knowledge of the Internet and social networking sites is almost a necessity. Businesses are learning about these new mediums and are discovering new ways of advertising and conducting business. It would be a detriment to not have employees who at least know what technology is available and is commonly used.

I also think that this incident will begin the discussion about people’s privacy interest in this type of information. The more and more people begin to “live” on the Internet, state legislatures will probably begin to define specifically what employers can and cannot ask for from employees.

Other articles of interest I’ve written related to employee’s on-line privacy in the workplace:

California Appellate Court Holds Postings On MySpace.com Are Not Private

Can An Employer Be Liable For Not Googling A Job Applicant?

Google Latitude In The Workplace

 

The case of David Donatelli is a good reminder to employers how important choice of law provisions can be in noncompetition agreements. The Trade Secrets and Noncompete Blog recently chronicled a fight between EMC Corp (based in Massachusetts) and Hewlett Packard Co. (based in California) over the enforceability of a noncompetition agreement with a former high level EMC employee.

California courts have clearly established that noncompetition agreements are very difficult to enforce under California law, as explained further below. Therefore, once Donatelli left employment with EMC, the company raced to file a lawsuit against the former employee to prevent him from working with HP in Massachusetts. HP also raced to file a lawsuit in California barring EMC from enforcing the noncompetition agreement.

The Massachusetts court ruled first, finding that the agreement was enforceable under Massachusetts law, and that California law does cannot affect the court’s ruling. The court allowed Donatelli to present evidence establishing that his duties and job at HP did not directly compete with his former position at EMC. The court allowed Donatelli to work for HP in California given the fact that he proved there is minimal overlap between his new HP position and his former position at EMC.

Noncompetition Agreements In California

In California, noncompetition agreements are governed by Business & Professions Code section 16600, which states: “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” The statute permits noncompetition agreements in the context of sale or dissolution of corporations (§ 16601), partnerships (§ 16602), and limited liability corporations (§ 16602.5).

Under the common law, as still recognized by many states today, contractual restraints on the practice of a profession, business, or trade, were considered valid, as long as they were reasonably imposed.

In 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled on the enforceability of noncompetition agreements under California in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP. Arthur Andersen argued that California courts have held that section 16600 embrace the rule of reasonableness in evaluating competitive restraints.

The Court disagreed with Arthur Andersen, and noted:

We conclude that Andersen’s noncompetition agreement was invalid. As the Court of Appeal observed, “The first challenged clause prohibited Edwards, for an 18-month period, from performing professional services of the type he had provided while at Andersen, for any client on whose account he had worked during 18 months prior to his termination. The second challenged clause prohibited Edwards, for a year after termination, from ‘soliciting,’ defined by the agreement as providing professional services to any client of Andersen’s Los Angeles office.” The agreement restricted Edwards from performing work for Andersen’s Los Angeles clients and therefore restricted his ability to practice his accounting profession.

The Court found that this agreement was invalid because it restrained Edwards’ ability to practice his profession.

However, Arthur Andersen argued that section 16600 has a “narrow-restraint” exception and that its agreement with Edwards survives under this exception. Andersen pointed out that a federal court in International Business Machines Corp. v. Bajorek (9th Cir. 1999) upheld an agreement mandating that an employee forfeits stock options if employed by a competitor within six months of leaving employment. Andersen also noted that a Ninth Circuit federal court in General Commercial Packaging v. TPS Package (9th Cir. 1997) held that a contractual provision barring one party from courting a specific customer was not an illegal restraint of trade prohibited by section 16600, because it did not “entirely preclude[]” the party from pursuing its trade or business.

In refusing to accept the “narrow-restraint” exception for noncompetition agreements in California, the Court stated:

Contrary to Andersen’s belief, however, California courts have not embraced the Ninth Circuit’s narrow-restraint exception. Indeed, no reported California state court decision has endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, and we are of the view that California courts “have been clear in their expression that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the state which should not be diluted by judicial fiat.” [citation] Section 16600 is unambiguous, and if the Legislature intended the statute to apply only to restraints that were unreasonable or overbroad, it could have included language to that effect. We reject Andersen’s contention that we should adopt a narrow-restraint exception to section 16600 and leave it to the Legislature, if it chooses, either to relax the statutory restrictions or adopt additional exceptions to the prohibition-against-restraint rule under section 16600.

The Court’s ruling basically eliminated the validity of non-competition agreements under California that are not expressly provided for in Section 16600.

The $86 million trial award against Starbucks for violation of California Labor Code provisions on tips was overturned by a California appellate court (Chau v. Starbucks). The case was initiated by Jou Chau who was a former Starbucks barista. He brought a class action against Starbucks alleging that the company’s policy permitting shift supervisors to share in tips that customers place in a collective tip box violated Labor Code section 351 and California Unfair Competition Law. The trial court certified a class action of current and former baristas and held a bench trial, in which it held Starbucks was liable for $86 million.

The appellate court, in overturning the trial court’s award, succinctly summarized the error it found the trial court made:

The applicable statutes do not prohibit Starbucks from permitting shift supervisors to share in the proceeds placed in collective tip boxes. The court’s ruling was improperly based on a line of decisions that concerns an employer’s authority to mandate that a tip given to an individual service employee must be shared with other employees. The policy challenged here presents the flip side of this mandatory tip-pooling practice. It concerns an employer’s authority to require equitable allocation of tips placed in a collective tip box for those employees providing service to the customer. There is no decisional or statutory authority prohibiting an employer from allowing a service employee to keep a portion of the collective tip, in proportion to the amount of hours worked, merely because the employee also has limited supervisory duties.

At issue in this case is the interpretation of Labor Code section 351, which states: "No employer or agent shall collect, take, or receive any gratuity or a part thereof that is paid, given to, or left for an employee by a patron . . . . Every gratuity is hereby declared to be the sole property of the employee or employees to whom it was paid, given, or left for." Plaintiff here argued that the shift supervisors who participated in sharing the tips left in the tip jar were “agents” of Starbucks, and therefore are prohibited from sharing in the tips.

The court explained the manner in which Starbucks collects and shares the tips left in the tip jars:

Because of the team-service approach, a collective tip box is provided for those customers who choose to tip the group of employees, rather than an individual. Collective tipping is the norm with occasional instances of individual tipping. Starbucks has a highly detailed written policy for collecting, storing, and distributing these collective tips. This policy requires each store to have a "standard 4" x 4" plexi cube container for tips." The container must be placed near each cash register, and should not have any signs on it. At the end of each day, an employee must store the tips under numerous rules that ensure the security of the tip funds.
Starbucks mandates that the only employees eligible to share in the weekly collective tips are "all baristas and shift supervisors who worked that week." Store managers and assistant managers are prohibited from receiving any portion of these tips. Additionally, only baristas and shift supervisors are eligible to count and distribute the tips. To calculate the weekly tip distribution, the selected counting employee must: (1) determine the total monetary amount from the tip container; (2) calculate the total number of hours worked by all baristas and shift supervisors in the particular store; (3) divide the total amount of hours by the store’s total earned tips for the week to obtain the tip hourly rate; (4) multiply each of the barista and shift supervisor hours by the tip hourly rate to determine each employee’s tip income; and (5) place each employee’s tip income in a sealed envelope, label the envelope with the employee’s name, and store the envelope in the safe until the employee is available to take possession of it.

The court recognized that if a customer left a tip for a particular employee, then the employee was entitled to keep that tip and was not required to place the tip in the collective tip jar.

Plaintiff argued that because the shift supervisors were considered Starbucks’ agent under Labor Code section 350, they cannot participate in the sharing of the tips even if they serviced customers who left tips in the communal tip jar.

The court found that even if the shift supervisors meet the definition of agent under section 350, Labor code section 351 does not prohibit Starbucks from allowing shift supervisors from sharing in tips that were left for baristas and for the shift supervisors. The court explained:

Because—as plaintiffs concede—section 351 does not prohibit a shift supervisor from keeping gratuities given to him or her for his or her customer services, there is no logical basis for concluding that section 351 prohibits an employer from allowing the shift supervisor to retain his or her portion of a collective tip that was intended for the entire team of service employees, including the shift supervisor. In this situation, the shift supervisor keeps only his or her earned portion of the gratuity and does not "take" any portion of the tip intended for services by the barista or baristas. If—as is undisputed here—the tips were left in the collective tip boxes for the baristas and shift supervisors, and it was permissible for Starbucks to require an equitable division of the tips according to the number of hours worked by each employee, it is not a violation of section 351 for the employer to maintain a policy ensuring those service employees benefit from a portion of those tips. Because a shift supervisor performs virtually the same service work as a barista and the employees work as a "team," Starbucks did not violate section 351 by requiring an equitable distribution of tips specifically left in a collective tip box for all of these employees.

Mandatory Tip Pooling vs. Tip Apportionment

The court explained there is a difference between mandatory tip pooling and tip apportionment:

[T[he legal principles prohibiting an employer from requiring an employee to share his or her personal tip with the employer’s agent ("mandatory tip pooling") do not logically apply to an employer policy requiring equitable apportionment of the proceeds in a collective tip box ("tip apportionment").

The court explained that under previous case law “an employer violates section 351 if it requires an employee to give up any part of his or her tip for the benefit of the employer’s agent.” However, the court set forth that the case here does not involve tip pooling, but rather tip apportionment. Starbucks did not require its baristas to give their tips to the shift supervisors. The policy at issue in this case was how employees divide tips left for them in a collective tip jar. The court held that Starbucks’ policy appropriately distributes the tips as close as possible to the intent of the customers who leave a tip in the jar, which does not violate the Labor Code.

Employers concerned about this issue should approach with caution. The court made it very clear that the case was decided on facts specific to Starbucks the policies specific to this case.

The case, World Financial Group, Inc. v. HBW Insurance & Financial Services, Inc. involved the situation where employees broke off from their former employer and started to work for a direct competitor. After leaving employment, the former employees made statements to former colleagues and customers in an attempt to have them join their new venture. 

However, the defendants signed an “Associate Membership Agreement” with World Financial that prohibited them from recruiting customers, employees, and sharing trade secrets of World Financial for a limited time after they left employment with World Financial. World Financial Group, filed the lawsuit for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Unfair Competition Law, intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and unjust enrichment. 

The defendants took an offensive step and filed an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit in arguing that their actions were protected speech. The court explained that an anti-SLAPP motion:

…provides that "[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." 

The issue in this case was whether defendants’ speech is afforded protection under the anti-SLAPP statue. The anti-SLAPP law applies to claims "arising from" speech or conduct "in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of . . . free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)

The court held that the type of speech at issue here was not protected. The court explained:

While employee mobility and competition are undoubtedly issues of public interest when considered in the abstract, one could arguably identify a strong public interest in the vindication of any right for which there is a legal remedy. "The fact that ‘a broad and amorphous public interest’ can be connected to a specific dispute is not sufficient to meet the statutory requirements" of the anti-SLAPP statute. [citation] By focusing on society’s general interest in the subject matter of the dispute instead of the specific speech or conduct upon which the complaint is based, defendants resort to the oft-rejected, so-called "synecdoche theory of public issue in the anti-SLAPP statute," where "[t]he part [is considered] synonymous with the greater whole." [citation] In evaluating the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, we must focus on "the specific nature of the speech rather than the generalities that might be abstracted from it. [citation.]" 

The court found that the defendants’ attempt to frame their speech as involving "the pursuit of lawful employment pursuant to Bus. & Prof. § 16600" and "workforce mobility and free competition" as “infirm.” The court held that the defendants’ speech did not rise to this protected level because it was merely soliciting a competitor’s employees and customers.  There was no public  The court stated that if it applied the anti-SLAPP statute as defendants requested, it “would effectively ‘eviscerate the unfair business practices laws,’ a result the Legislature plainly did not intend.” To bring the point home, the court quoted The Godfather: “As Salvatore Tessio said to Tom Hagen, ‘Tell Mike it was only business.’ So it is here.”

The Wall Street Journal recently wrote about how employees are surprised after being given notice that they have been laid-off that they cannot retrieve personal (and business related) information from their computers. The author notes that with advances in technology that often times blur the boundaries between work and personal pursuits, many employees are hit really hard when they cannot retrieve their personal contacts from their work PDA or computer:

As layoffs sweep across industries, employees’ personal information is winding up in the dustbin, as well. Most workers know better than to store personal files on their office computer. But employees who spend the majority of their time at the office often treat the company PC as their personal gadget, filling it with music, photos, personal contacts — even using the computer’s calendar to track a child’s soccer schedule. That makes it all the more distressing when a newly laid-off worker learns that his digital belongings are company property.

The author correctly notes that what information is the employee’s as opposed to the employers is probably going to be set forth in and governed by the employer’s policies. Often times these policies will be provided to the employee when he or she first starts:

Employees worried about their job security should review the forms they signed when they were hired. They should look at the company’s electronic communications policy, employee guidelines and non-compete agreements to make sure they understand everything properly. When employees sign these agreements, they should also make copies to save at home, too, Ms. Yancey says. Those that break these agreements risk being fired or sued by their employer, she adds.

It is important to note that in California, it is extremely difficult for employers to enforce non-competition agreements due to a California Supreme Court ruling in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen last year. California employers can still protect company information through other means, such as establishing that the information is a trade secret, or is proprietary information.

Steps California Employers Should Take To Avoid Litigation Over Electronic Data

  • California employers need to establish a clear policy that establishes that the employee does not have any privacy expectation in any data stored on company owned computers or devises.
  • The policy should establish that all aspects of an employee’s use of company equipment can be monitored.
  • Employers need to have the employees sign an acknowledgment of electronic data and monitoring policy.
  • The employer should remind employees of the electronic data policy at least every year.
  • If employers do have trade secrets, they need to maintain strict protocols to ensure that only employees with a “need to know” have access to the information and take steps to ensure that the information is protected.
  • If an employee who has been laid off requests personal information from his or her computer such as family pictures, an employer’s accommodation of this request will be somewhat of a step towards minimizing the employee’s ill-will towards the company (and less likely to pursue litigation against the company).