I believe it would be hard for the California Courts to establish that the Labor Code would apply to the workers stationed in a ship outside of the U.S. boarders for work completed outside of the state. Recently, the California Supreme Court held in Sullivan v. Oracle Corporation that California Corporations that employ non-resident workers in the state of California are subject to California’s Labor Code provisions, such as requirements for overtime pay which are vastly different than other states’ law and federal law (click here for a more detailed analysis of the Oracle decision). The Court in Oracle explained that states have broad authority under their police powers to regulate employment matters within their boundaries (such as child labor laws, minimum and other wage laws, and workers compensation laws). The Court stated, “To exclude nonresidents from the overtime laws’ protection would tend to defeat their purpose by encouraging employers to import unprotected workers from other states.”

However, that case was limited to work performed in California. The scenario proposed by the Silicon Valley entrepreneurs is vastly different, where non-citizens perform work outside of the U.S. and California boarders, and only travel into the State for meetings. It is analogous to the situation where employees living in China, but working for a California corporation, routinely travel to California for work.  Under Oracle, the argument could be made that the employees may have to be paid according to California law for the work done while in California, but it is unlikely this requirement would extend to the work done outside the state while on the ship.  These types of issues will be more and more common given how technology is changing the traditional concepts that workers have to be in a certain building, or even country, while performing work. 

The Plaintiffs were employed by Oracle as instructors who train Oracle’s customers in the use of the company’s products. Two Plaintiffs reside in Colorado, and another plaintiff resides in Arizona. The Plaintiffs primarily worked in their home states but also performed work in California and other states. During the relevant time period for this case (2001-2004), Plaintiff Sullivan worked 74 days in California, Plaintiff Evich worked 110 days, and Plaintiff Burkow worked 20 days.

The case came to the California Supreme Court as a request by the Ninth Circuit to decide unresolved questions of California law. The issues presented to the Court were:

1. Does the California Labor Code apply to overtime work performed in California for a California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case, such that overtime pay is required for work in excess of eight hours per day or in excess of forty hours per week?
2. Does Business and Professions Code section 17200 apply to the overtime work described in question one?
3. Does Section 17200 apply to overtime work performed outside California for a California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case if the employer failed to comply with the overtime provisions of the FLSA?

Does California Overtime Apply to Out-Of-State Plaintiffs Working In California?

The Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs were owed California overtime. It explained:

California’s overtime laws apply by their terms to all employment in the state, without reference to the employee’s place of residence. The overtime statute declares simply that “[a]ny work in excess of eight hours in one workday and . . . 40 hours in any one workweek . . . shall be compensated at the rate of no less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay . . . .” (Lab. Code, § 510, subd. (a), italics added.) The civil enforcement provision provides that “any employee receiving less than . . . the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance . . . .” (Id., § 1194, subd. (a), italics added.) Moreover, a preambular section of the wage law (Lab. Code, div. 2, pt. 4, ch. 1, §1171 et seq.) confirms that our employment laws apply to “all individuals” employed in this state (id., § 1171.5, subd. (a), italics added).

The Court explained that states have broad authority under their police powers to regulate employment matters within their boundaries (such as child labor laws, minimum and other wage laws, and workers compensation laws). “To exclude nonresidents from the overtime laws’ protection would tend to defeat their purpose by encouraging employers to import unprotected workers from other states.”

The Court was clear that the holding in this case is limited to the facts presented to it. The court stated, “[t]hus, we are not prepared, without more thorough briefing of the issues, to hold that IWC wage orders apply to all employment in California, and never to employment outside of California.” (emphasis in original).

Does B&P Code Section 17200 (“Unfair Competition Law” or “UCL”) Apply to The Unpaid Overtime?

The Supreme Court held it does, stating:

We have already decided that the failure to pay legally required overtime compensation falls within the UCL’s definition of an “unlawful . . . business act or practice”

Does the UCL Apply When To Claims Under the FLSA for Overtime Worked By Nonresidents In Other States?

The Court concluded that the UCL does not apply to claims under the FLSA for alleged violations that occurred in other states. It explained that in holding so would extend the UCL to apply outside of California’s boarders, in violation of the “presumption against extraterritorial application.”
 

The Governor explained:

In order to remain competitive against other states that do not have such wage requirements, businesses will simply avoid paying overtime.

The bill would have also applied California’s meal and rest break requirements to farm workers. The Governor also cited this as a reason why he vetoed the law:

Finally, it should be noted that Senate Bill 1121 would not just change the rules governing overtime pay for agricultural workers, but would also apply California's confusing and burdensome rest and meal requirements. Unfortunately, while there have been several attempts to clean up this section of law, efforts at comprehensive reform continue to fail. There is no reason to exacerbate this continuing problem by adding agricultural workers to it. For these reasons, I am unable to sign this bill.

The Governor’s statement is referring to the issues that the California Supreme Court is currently reviewing in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court. One of the many issues being reviewed in Brinker, is whether California employers need to only provide, not ensure, employees with their 30-minute meal break under California law. Click here for more analysis on the Brinker case. 
 

The DOL notes:

The financial services industry assigns a variety of job titles to employees who perform the typical job duties of a mortgage loan officer. Those job titles include mortgage loan representative, mortgage loan consultant, and mortgage loan originator.

The interpretation letter found that the typical mortgage loan officer’s duties begin with obtaining clients, collecting information about the clients (such as income, employment history, investments, and so forth), and then inputting this information into a computer program. The program sets forth appropriate loan products for the clients. The officer would then discuss the different pros and cons for each product with the client in order to match the client’s needs with one of the offered products.

The DOL noted that for the loan officer to qualify as exempt, their primary duty must be “the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers.” Work directly related to management or general business operations consists of work in areas such as accounting, budgeting, quality control, and human resources – not actually producing the product sold by the company or selling the product made by the company.

The DOL interpretation concluded:

Thus, a careful examination of the law as applied to the mortgage loan officers' duties demonstrates that their primary duty is making sales and, therefore, mortgage loan officers perform the production work of their employers. Work such as collecting financial information from customers, entering it into the computer program to determine what particular loan products might be available to that customer, and explaining the terms of the available options and the pros and cons of each option, so that a sale can be made, constitutes the production work of an employer engaged in selling or brokering mortgage loan products.

This new guidance from the DOL establishes that employers in the financial industry with employees – in particular loan officers – must review this new interpretation and evaluate whether certain employees can simply be paid a salary, or if the employees must be reclassified as non-exempt and receive overtime. The DOL letter can be read here (PDF).

As defenses, RHI argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred because they all entered into agreements that shortened their statute of limitations down from four years to six months. RHI also argued that the Plaintiffs were exempt from wage and hour laws because the employees qualified for the administrative exemption. The appellate court, in agreeing with the lower trial court, dismissed RHI’s defense that the Plaintiffs’ agreed to a shorter statute of limitation on the grounds that this agreement violated public policy and is unenforceable.

The Administrative Exemption

Employers bear the burden to prove that the employee does not qualify for overtime of one and a half times the employee’s regular hourly rate for all work performed over eight hours in one day and/or all hours over 40 in one week. Employees can qualify for a number of different exemptions, and in this case RHI argued that the Plaintiffs were administrative employees.

In order to qualify for the administrative exemption, the court noted that the employer must prove that the employee must:

(1) perform office or non manual work directly related to management policies or general business operations’ of the employer or its customers,

(2) customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment,

(3) perform under only general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training or execute under only general supervision special assignments and tasks,

(4) be engaged in the activities meeting the test for the exemption at least 50 percent of the time, and

(5) earn twice the state’s minimum wage.

The employee must meet all five elements in order to be an exempt administrative employee.

The court explained, by quoting the applicable regulations, that:

“The phrase ‘directly related to management policies or general business operations of his employer or his employer’s customers’ describes those types of activities relating to the administrative operations of a business as distinguished from ‘production’ or, in a retail or service establishment, ‘sales’ work. In addition to describing the types of activities, the phrase limits the exemption to persons who perform work of substantial importance to the management or operation of the business of his employer or his employer’s customers.”

The court found that the evidence did not support RHI’s argument that the Plaintiffs were administrative employees. The court explained that the account executives were trained in sales and evaluated on how well they met sales production numbers – which are not exempt duties. The account executives were also primarily responsible for selling the services of RHI’s temporary employees to its clients. And when they were not selling, they were recruiting more candidates for RHI’s “inventory.” The account executives also followed a “recipe” established by the company which required the employees to rotate their duties ever week between a “sales week,” “desk week,” and recruiting week.” The employees did not develop any policy, but simply followed the company’s system of performing their job. The court finally noted that the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) previously opined that recruiters who worked in a recruiting company did not qualify for the administrative exemption (which can be read at the DLSE’s website here (PDF)). All of these facts supported the trial court’s finding that the employer failed to meet its burden that the account executives were administrative employees.

This case is a good reminder to employers that they must be careful about how employees are classified. Simply because the employee has a high-level title, or every employer in the particular industry has always treated this type of employee as an exempt employee does not mean that the employees are properly classified. Courts will strictly apply the applicable exemption element-by-element to determine whether or not the employer must pay the employee overtime and provide meal and rest breaks. Finally, employers must remember that they will bear the burden of proof when asserting in court that the employee is properly classified as an exempt employee.

The case, Pellegrino v. Robert Half International, Inc. can be downloaded here (PDF).

1. An employee may work no more than 11 hours on another workday, an not more than 40 hours in the workweek to make up for the time off;
2. The time missed must be made up within the same workweek;
3. The employee needs to provide a signed written request to the employer for each occasion that they want to makeup time (and if employers permit makeup time, they should have a carefully drafted policy on makeup time and a system to document employee requests); and
4. Employers cannot solicit or encourage employees to request makeup time, but employers may inform employees of this option.

Remember, time and a half overtime is due for (1) time over eight hours in one day or (2) over 40 hours in one week or (3) the first eight hours worked on the seventh consecutive day worked in a single workweek; and double time is due for (1) time over 12 hours in one day and (2) hours worked beyond eight on the seventh consecutive day in a single workweek. For more information regarding overtime and related issues, the DLSE provides a good summary here.