Meal Break Claim

Defendant Boyd argued that the on-duty meal periods at issue in this case created individualized issues that were not suitable for class-wide treatment by the court. In reviewing defendant’s argument, the court explained that on-duty meal periods are permissible if it meets the “nature of the work exception”:

Under the nature of the work exception, an employer is not required to provide off duty meal breaks “when the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of all duty and when by written agreement between the parties an on the job paid meal period is agreed to.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11040, subd. 11(A).) On duty meal period agreements are permitted under Wage Order No. 4 2001, California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 11040, subdivision 11(A). Based on the nature of the work exception, Boyd argues its liability to the Meal Break Class depends on individual issues regarding the nature of the work at each post and whether each employee did in fact take on duty meal breaks.

The court noted that Boyd did have a company-wide uniform policy of requiring security guard employees to take on duty meal breaks and required them to sign on duty meal break agreements. However, the court also recognized that individualized issues still existed. For example, Boyd submitted evidence that guards were able to take meal break “during periods of inactivity” and other guards stated that they are relieved of all duty in order to take a meal break. Boyd also submitted evidence showing that some of its guards were able to take off-duty meal breaks, it depended on the employees’ post they were assigned to, and other factors could make it possible for employees to take an off-duty break. Some employees submitted declarations saying that Boyd’s clients’ in-house security would relieve a Boyd security guard for a meal and rest break and on other occasions a second Boyd security guard would cover the other’s post to enable one of them to take a break.

The court also noted:

The ability of a Boyd security guard employee to take an off-duty meal break sometimes depended on whether the employee was training another employee (“When I am training another security officer we will relieve each other of all duty during meal and rest periods”). Some guards put out a sign saying “on a break” and took an off duty break.
The trial court held, and the appellate court agreed, that these issues were enough to create individual issues of liability predominate over common issues.

Rest Break Claim

The court held that to determine Boyd’s liability for failing to authorize and permit off duty rest breaks, individual determinations would have to be made for each security guard employee for each shift worked.

In at least one declaration, the employee stated he determined, based on the circumstances, when to take a rest break, and “[w]hen these periods occur I place a sign out to inform visitors that I am on break and will be back shortly.” Another employee declared she frequently took rest breaks at her post, but was able to “watch television, read magazines or books, or engage in other non security related activities.”

The court concluded that the evidence established that there was no common proof regarding a finding of Boyd’s liability for rest breaks. Boyd had no formal policy denying off-duty rest breaks, Boyd did not require employees to waive them, and whether a guard took a rest break depended on a number of individual circumstances.

Therefore, the court held that the trial court was correct in holding that the meal and rest break claims were not suitable for class-wide treatment. The opinion, Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc., can be read in full here.
 

Should the employer fail to maintain the records required under the proposed bill, a presumption would be created that the worker is an employee – not an independent contractor. The employer could only then overturn this presumption by presenting “clear and convincing evidence” that the worker is properly classified.

The bill would also require employers to provide written notice to any non-employees about their classification. Among other items, the notice would need to state:

Your rights to wage, hour, and other labor protections depend upon your proper classification as an employee or non-employee. If you have any questions or concerns about how you have been classified or suspect that you may have been misclassified, contact the U.S. Department of Labor.

The notice would also need to include additional information that Department of Labor deems necessary by regulation at a later date.

Violation of the proposed bill’s requirements carries a civil fine of $1,100 per worker, which could increase to $5,000 for willful repeat violations.

The bill (H.R. 5107) can be read here. From what I could gather, it appears that the bill has a strong chance of becoming law. This is definitely one I will be keeping my eye on in coming months.

In April 2010, the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) issued an opinion letter setting for the analysis it would conduct in making a determination regarding whether an intern is properly classified.  In its opinion letter, the DLSE set forth that it would examine the following factors:

1. The training, even though it includes actual operation o the employer’s facilities, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school;
2. The training is for the benefit of the trainees or students;
3. The trainees or students do not displace regular employees, but work under their close observations;
4. The employer derives no immediate advantage from the activities of trainees or students, and on occasion the employer’s operations may be actually impeded;
5. The trainees or students are not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training period; and
6. The employer and the trainees or students understand that the trainees or students are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.

While these factors are a fairly loose test, an intern attempting to challenge the classification as an intern would probably have at least a few good facts to support their position. This is why California employers need to approach the intern classification with caution.

The DOL notes:

The financial services industry assigns a variety of job titles to employees who perform the typical job duties of a mortgage loan officer. Those job titles include mortgage loan representative, mortgage loan consultant, and mortgage loan originator.

The interpretation letter found that the typical mortgage loan officer’s duties begin with obtaining clients, collecting information about the clients (such as income, employment history, investments, and so forth), and then inputting this information into a computer program. The program sets forth appropriate loan products for the clients. The officer would then discuss the different pros and cons for each product with the client in order to match the client’s needs with one of the offered products.

The DOL noted that for the loan officer to qualify as exempt, their primary duty must be “the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers.” Work directly related to management or general business operations consists of work in areas such as accounting, budgeting, quality control, and human resources – not actually producing the product sold by the company or selling the product made by the company.

The DOL interpretation concluded:

Thus, a careful examination of the law as applied to the mortgage loan officers' duties demonstrates that their primary duty is making sales and, therefore, mortgage loan officers perform the production work of their employers. Work such as collecting financial information from customers, entering it into the computer program to determine what particular loan products might be available to that customer, and explaining the terms of the available options and the pros and cons of each option, so that a sale can be made, constitutes the production work of an employer engaged in selling or brokering mortgage loan products.

This new guidance from the DOL establishes that employers in the financial industry with employees – in particular loan officers – must review this new interpretation and evaluate whether certain employees can simply be paid a salary, or if the employees must be reclassified as non-exempt and receive overtime. The DOL letter can be read here (PDF).

A general rule for Courts is found in Civil Code section 3513, which provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” California courts have found that many of the Labor Code provisions are for the public good, and therefore cannot be waived by an employee.  

Labor Code Provisions An Employee Cannot Waive:

• Minimum Wage & Overtime

Labor Code Section 1194 provides a private right of action to enforce violations of minimum wage and overtime laws. That statute clearly voids any agreement between an employer and employee to work for less than minimum wage or not to receive overtime:

Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

In Gentry v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court further explained:

[Labor Code] Section 510 provides that nonexempt employees will be paid one and one-half their wages for hours worked in excess of eight per day and 40 per week and twice their wages for work in excess of 12 hours a day or eight hours on the seventh day of work. Section 1194 provides a private right of action to enforce violations of minimum wage and overtime laws.
…
By its terms, the rights to the legal minimum wage and legal overtime compensation conferred by the statute are unwaivable. “Labor Code section 1194 confirms ‘a clear public policy . . . that is specifically directed at the enforcement of California’s minimum wage and overtime laws for the benefit of workers.’”

• Expense Reimbursement

Labor Code section 2802 requires employers to reimburse its employees for “necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee” while performing his or her job duties. Labor Code section 2804, clearly provides that an employee cannot waive this right to be reimbursed for or liable for the cost of doing business. Section 2804 provides, “Any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this article or any part thereof, is null and void….”

Labor Code Provisions An Employee May Be Able To Waive:

While it is unclear, the following items could possibly be waived by an employee. However, these areas are very unsettled, and employers should approach with caution when seeking waivers from employees on these issues.

• Meal Breaks

The California Supreme Court is currently reviewing the case Brinker v. Superior Court, that should address, among other issues, the standard regarding how employers need to provide meals breaks. At issue is whether employers need to simply “provide” employees with meal breaks, or on the other hand, “ensure” that employees take meal breaks. If the Supreme Court rules that employers only need to provide meal breaks, then if the employee chooses not to take the meal break, then arguably there would be no violation. The Supreme Court will hopefully issue a ruling on this case in 2010.

• Waiver To Participate In A Class Action

Given the increase in wage and hour class actions, employers began seeking agreements from their employees that if a dispute would arise about any wage and hour issue, the employee would agree to only seek remedies on an individual basis, not through a class action. The California Supreme Court reviewed the issue if an employee could enter into such an agreement and found that, “at least in some cases, the prohibition of classwide relief would undermine the vindication of the employees’ unwaivable statutory rights and would pose a serious obstacle to the enforcement of the state’s overtime laws.” The Court therefore set out a number of factors that a trial court must look at to determine whether the class action waiver is enforceable or not. As of February 2010, there has not been a class action waiver that has been upheld by an appellate court in California. So while there is the possibility of enforcing such waivers, this possibility is very slight.
 

As defenses, RHI argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred because they all entered into agreements that shortened their statute of limitations down from four years to six months. RHI also argued that the Plaintiffs were exempt from wage and hour laws because the employees qualified for the administrative exemption. The appellate court, in agreeing with the lower trial court, dismissed RHI’s defense that the Plaintiffs’ agreed to a shorter statute of limitation on the grounds that this agreement violated public policy and is unenforceable.

The Administrative Exemption

Employers bear the burden to prove that the employee does not qualify for overtime of one and a half times the employee’s regular hourly rate for all work performed over eight hours in one day and/or all hours over 40 in one week. Employees can qualify for a number of different exemptions, and in this case RHI argued that the Plaintiffs were administrative employees.

In order to qualify for the administrative exemption, the court noted that the employer must prove that the employee must:

(1) perform office or non manual work directly related to management policies or general business operations’ of the employer or its customers,

(2) customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment,

(3) perform under only general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training or execute under only general supervision special assignments and tasks,

(4) be engaged in the activities meeting the test for the exemption at least 50 percent of the time, and

(5) earn twice the state’s minimum wage.

The employee must meet all five elements in order to be an exempt administrative employee.

The court explained, by quoting the applicable regulations, that:

“The phrase ‘directly related to management policies or general business operations of his employer or his employer’s customers’ describes those types of activities relating to the administrative operations of a business as distinguished from ‘production’ or, in a retail or service establishment, ‘sales’ work. In addition to describing the types of activities, the phrase limits the exemption to persons who perform work of substantial importance to the management or operation of the business of his employer or his employer’s customers.”

The court found that the evidence did not support RHI’s argument that the Plaintiffs were administrative employees. The court explained that the account executives were trained in sales and evaluated on how well they met sales production numbers – which are not exempt duties. The account executives were also primarily responsible for selling the services of RHI’s temporary employees to its clients. And when they were not selling, they were recruiting more candidates for RHI’s “inventory.” The account executives also followed a “recipe” established by the company which required the employees to rotate their duties ever week between a “sales week,” “desk week,” and recruiting week.” The employees did not develop any policy, but simply followed the company’s system of performing their job. The court finally noted that the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) previously opined that recruiters who worked in a recruiting company did not qualify for the administrative exemption (which can be read at the DLSE’s website here (PDF)). All of these facts supported the trial court’s finding that the employer failed to meet its burden that the account executives were administrative employees.

This case is a good reminder to employers that they must be careful about how employees are classified. Simply because the employee has a high-level title, or every employer in the particular industry has always treated this type of employee as an exempt employee does not mean that the employees are properly classified. Courts will strictly apply the applicable exemption element-by-element to determine whether or not the employer must pay the employee overtime and provide meal and rest breaks. Finally, employers must remember that they will bear the burden of proof when asserting in court that the employee is properly classified as an exempt employee.

The case, Pellegrino v. Robert Half International, Inc. can be downloaded here (PDF).

The arbitration agreement at issue in the case provided:

I hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims arising out of the submission of this application. I further agree, in the event that I am hired by the company, that all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal internal resolution which might arise out of my employment with the company, whether during or after that employment, will be submitted to binding arbitration. I agree that such arbitration shall be conducted under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. This application contains the entire agreement between the parties with regard to dispute resolution, and there are no other agreements as to dispute resolution, either oral or written.

Id. at 1467 (citation omitted). The agreement was contained in an employment application and clearly provided: “Please Read Carefully, Initial Each Paragraph and Sign Below.” Plaintiff also initialed next to the paragraph that contained the arbitration agreement. The court found that simply because the agreement in that case was an adhesion contract (or on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis), it still did not render the agreement unenforceable because the agreement was fair. Even though the agreement contained the words “I agree”, this did not render the arbitration agreement to only bind the employee and not the employer to the arbitration agreement.

The Roman court also noted that even if the agreement “were somehow ambiguous on this point, given the public policy favoring arbitration [citation] and the requirement we interpret the provision in a manner that renders it legal rather than void [citation], we would necessarily construe the arbitration agreement as imposing a valid, mutual obligation to arbitrate.” Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1473.  Employers should consider the pros and cons of having employees enter into arbitration agreements, and as this case illustrates, courts are likely to enforce the agreement if it is properly drafted. 

Kris’ analysis is right on for a number of reasons. First, lawyers are trained to point out the risks of any situation to properly advise their clients. Second, lawyers are notoriously behind the technology curve. Most do not know what “new” technologies are being used or how to use them, and this creates concern as anyone is scared about what they do not know about.

Employment lawyers need to take heed of this critique. HR professionals have jobs to perform and companies to run. They need legal advice that helps them perform their jobs better – not scare them into failing to change and keeping up with the times.

Employment lawyers need to recognize that change entails risk. However, companies always have to change, and lawyers need to help companies navigate this risk, not prevent them from doing anything new.

Note to HR professionals

As you know, the HR profession is changing a lot given today’s new technologies. New issues are creating a lot of uncertainty. Issues such as how to use social networking sites to conduct background checks, monitoring employee’s internet use, and determining "hours worked" when employees always have a smart device on them.

When looking for legal advice about these issues, you need to be certain that your lawyer is familiar and up-to-date with the technology available. Does the lawyer who you are seeking legal advice from have a Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn account? Do they use an iPhone or Blackberry? If the answer to these questions are ‘no’ – don't be surprised if their advice is to avoid these “new” technologies.

1. Assuming everyone can be paid a salary, and not paying overtime for hours over 8 in one day or 40 in one week. For a company to not pay overtime, it has the burden of proof to establish that the employee meets an exemption to California’s overtime laws. The exemptions are based on the amount of pay the employee receives and the duties the employee performs.
2. Not researching particular laws that apply to the industry or city. For example, businesses in San Francisco have to provide for paid sick leave.
3. Not having a meal and rest break policy. It goes without saying, every company in California needs a meal and rest break policy – and evidence that this policy is regularly communicated to employees.
4. Not recording meal breaks. Employers are required to not only provide meal breaks, but also keep records of when the employee started and stopped the meal break.
5. Not paying accrued vacation when employment is severed. Accrued and unused vacation is considered wages under California law, and needs to be paid out at the end of employment regardless of whether the employee is fired or quits.
6. Overestimating the enforceability of covenants not to compete. Nine times out of ten, covenants not to compete are unenforceable in California.
7. Underestimating the importance of an employee handbook.
8. Assuming any worker can be classified as an independent contractor. Just like exempt employees, employers will bear the burden of proof when it comes to classifying independent contractors. Generally, the test is how much control the employer has over the worker.
9. Withholding the money necessary to hire an HR manager knowledgeable with California law.
10. Not reimbursing employees for business related expenses, such as travel expenses. Under Labor Code section 2802, employers are required to repay employees who pay for business related items out of their own pocket.

denied review of a lower appellate court decision in the class action of Chau v. Starbucks

However, on appeal, this award was reversed. In a favorable ruling for employers, the appellate court took a more common sense reading of Labor Code section 351, explaining:

There is no decisional or statutory authority prohibiting an employer from allowing a service employee to keep a portion of the collective tip, in proportion to the amount of hours worked, merely because the employee also has limited supervisory duties. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and order the trial court to enter judgment in Starbucks's favor.

The Supreme Court’s decision not to review the appellate court’s decision establishes that decision as precedent and binding in California. Click here for a more detailed analysis of the appellate court's decision. 

However, employers are cautioned to review the appellate decision (and obtain legal advice) before allowing managers to share in tip sharing arrangements. For example, the Starbucks ruling involved the situation where there was a "collective tip box" that "a customer would necessarily understand the tip will be shared among the employees who provide the service” and that the managerial employee is part of the team that provided the service.

Other notes about California minimum wage:

• There is no tip credit allowed in California for tipped employees. Employers still must pay $8.00 per hour even for employees who receive tips while working.  Click here for a list of states that do recognize a tip credit. 
• Employees cannot not waive their right to receive minimum wage (see Labor Code section 1194(a)).
• There are a very limited number of employees who are exempt from minimum wages, such as outside salespersons or family members of the employer.
• If an employee prevails in a lawsuit for unpaid minimum wages, he or she is also entitled to attorney’s fees as costs of the suit under Labor Code section 1194(a) (which, often times are larger than the minimum wage amounts not paid in the first place). 
   

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Owens v. Local No. 169, Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers (9th Cir. 1992) 971 F.2d 347, 350-355, provided a nonexclusive list of factors courts would examining in determining whether the employee was free to engage in personal activities (note that none of the factors is determinative by itself):

1. whether there was an on premises living requirement;
2. whether there were excessive geographical restrictions on employee’s movements;
3. whether the frequency of calls was unduly restrictive;
4. whether a fixed time limit for response was unduly restrictive;
5. whether the on-call employee could easily trade on-call responsibilities;
6. whether use of a pager could ease restrictions; and
7. whether the employee had actually engaged in personal activities during call-in time.

In addition, the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement published this guideline on call back time and stand by time. Employers need to conduct a review of each case when on-call time may be an issue in order to determine whether pay is owed.
 

The appellate court, in overturning the trial court’s award, succinctly summarized the error it found the trial court made:

The applicable statutes do not prohibit Starbucks from permitting shift supervisors to share in the proceeds placed in collective tip boxes. The court's ruling was improperly based on a line of decisions that concerns an employer's authority to mandate that a tip given to an individual service employee must be shared with other employees. The policy challenged here presents the flip side of this mandatory tip-pooling practice. It concerns an employer's authority to require equitable allocation of tips placed in a collective tip box for those employees providing service to the customer. There is no decisional or statutory authority prohibiting an employer from allowing a service employee to keep a portion of the collective tip, in proportion to the amount of hours worked, merely because the employee also has limited supervisory duties.

At issue in this case is the interpretation of Labor Code section 351, which states: "No employer or agent shall collect, take, or receive any gratuity or a part thereof that is paid, given to, or left for an employee by a patron . . . . Every gratuity is hereby declared to be the sole property of the employee or employees to whom it was paid, given, or left for." Plaintiff here argued that the shift supervisors who participated in sharing the tips left in the tip jar were “agents” of Starbucks, and therefore are prohibited from sharing in the tips.

The court explained the manner in which Starbucks collects and shares the tips left in the tip jars:

Because of the team-service approach, a collective tip box is provided for those customers who choose to tip the group of employees, rather than an individual. Collective tipping is the norm with occasional instances of individual tipping. Starbucks has a highly detailed written policy for collecting, storing, and distributing these collective tips. This policy requires each store to have a "standard 4" x 4" plexi cube container for tips." The container must be placed near each cash register, and should not have any signs on it. At the end of each day, an employee must store the tips under numerous rules that ensure the security of the tip funds.
Starbucks mandates that the only employees eligible to share in the weekly collective tips are "all baristas and shift supervisors who worked that week." Store managers and assistant managers are prohibited from receiving any portion of these tips. Additionally, only baristas and shift supervisors are eligible to count and distribute the tips. To calculate the weekly tip distribution, the selected counting employee must: (1) determine the total monetary amount from the tip container; (2) calculate the total number of hours worked by all baristas and shift supervisors in the particular store; (3) divide the total amount of hours by the store's total earned tips for the week to obtain the tip hourly rate; (4) multiply each of the barista and shift supervisor hours by the tip hourly rate to determine each employee's tip income; and (5) place each employee's tip income in a sealed envelope, label the envelope with the employee's name, and store the envelope in the safe until the employee is available to take possession of it.

The court recognized that if a customer left a tip for a particular employee, then the employee was entitled to keep that tip and was not required to place the tip in the collective tip jar.

Plaintiff argued that because the shift supervisors were considered Starbucks’ agent under Labor Code section 350, they cannot participate in the sharing of the tips even if they serviced customers who left tips in the communal tip jar.

The court found that even if the shift supervisors meet the definition of agent under section 350, Labor code section 351 does not prohibit Starbucks from allowing shift supervisors from sharing in tips that were left for baristas and for the shift supervisors. The court explained:

Because—as plaintiffs concede—section 351 does not prohibit a shift supervisor from keeping gratuities given to him or her for his or her customer services, there is no logical basis for concluding that section 351 prohibits an employer from allowing the shift supervisor to retain his or her portion of a collective tip that was intended for the entire team of service employees, including the shift supervisor. In this situation, the shift supervisor keeps only his or her earned portion of the gratuity and does not "take" any portion of the tip intended for services by the barista or baristas. If—as is undisputed here—the tips were left in the collective tip boxes for the baristas and shift supervisors, and it was permissible for Starbucks to require an equitable division of the tips according to the number of hours worked by each employee, it is not a violation of section 351 for the employer to maintain a policy ensuring those service employees benefit from a portion of those tips. Because a shift supervisor performs virtually the same service work as a barista and the employees work as a "team," Starbucks did not violate section 351 by requiring an equitable distribution of tips specifically left in a collective tip box for all of these employees.

Mandatory Tip Pooling vs. Tip Apportionment

The court explained there is a difference between mandatory tip pooling and tip apportionment:

[T[he legal principles prohibiting an employer from requiring an employee to share his or her personal tip with the employer's agent ("mandatory tip pooling") do not logically apply to an employer policy requiring equitable apportionment of the proceeds in a collective tip box ("tip apportionment").

The court explained that under previous case law “an employer violates section 351 if it requires an employee to give up any part of his or her tip for the benefit of the employer's agent.” However, the court set forth that the case here does not involve tip pooling, but rather tip apportionment. Starbucks did not require its baristas to give their tips to the shift supervisors. The policy at issue in this case was how employees divide tips left for them in a collective tip jar. The court held that Starbucks’ policy appropriately distributes the tips as close as possible to the intent of the customers who leave a tip in the jar, which does not violate the Labor Code.

Employers concerned about this issue should approach with caution. The court made it very clear that the case was decided on facts specific to Starbucks the policies specific to this case.

Plaintiffs sought compensation for the on call time spent resolving customer questions by phone, and for all the time they were on call, even when not responding to customer calls. Plaintiffs also claimed they were entitled to a premium rate of compensation, rather than their regular rate of compensation, for all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day or 40 hours per week.

Background Facts

Plaintiffs worked eight hour shifts Monday through Friday. When plaintiffs worked more than eight hours in one day as part of their regular hours, they were paid overtime rates.

Plaintiffs were also required to carry a pager or cell phone after their regular work hours and respond to patient phone calls at night or on the weekend. Lincare’s on call policy required plaintiffs to respond telephonically to pages within 30 minutes, and to be available to respond to patient calls, in person, within two hours. Plaintiffs were prohibited from consuming alcohol while on call, but were otherwise free to engage in any activities desired.

When plaintiffs made service visits after hours, they were compensated by Lincare at the regular rate of pay. If plaintiffs were able to resolve the customer’s problem by telephone without making a service visit, they were instructed not to record that time, and they were not compensated for it.

Drivers' Overtime Claim

Lincare argued that because plaintiffs transported hazardous materials as part of their jobs, they were exempt from California’s statutory overtime rules.

As set out by the court, California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 11020, subdivision 3(J)(2) exempts from the rules regarding overtime compensation those employees whose hours of service are regulated by California Code of Regulations, title 13. Title 13, section 1212.5, subdivision (b) limits the driving time of employees who transport hazardous materials, such as liquid oxygen.

Lincare argued that because plaintiffs transport hazardous materials, they were exempt from overtime pay requirements of Labor Code section 510. The appellate court, in overruling the trial court, disagreed with Lincare’s argument. The appellate court held that in order to succeed, Lincare would have to establish that the drivers drove a vehicle containing hazardous materials for some period of time each and every workday:

As relevant to this appeal, the 2002 Update of the DLSE (Division of Labor Standards Enforcement) Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual (Revised) (Enforcement Manual) provides: “The IWC exemption only applies to employees whose regular duty is that of a driver, not any other category of worker. The policy would cover employees regularly employed as relief drivers or as assistant drivers. However, any driver who does not drive or operate a truck for any period of time during an entire workday is entitled to overtime premium compensation for all overtime hours worked performing duties other than driving during that day. [Citation.]” (Id., § 50.9.2.1, p. 50 11, italics added, <http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DLSEManual/dlse_enfcmanual.pdf> [as of April 3, 2009].)

The court held that Lincare did not meet this burden, as there was evidence that the drivers often times did not drive a truck for the entire day.

The opinion, Gomez v. Lincare, Inc., also provided good analysis of other wage and hour issues, such as when on-call time needs to be compensated. The opinion is definite worth the read for wage and hour litigators.

The court first explained that Labor Code section 351 does not impose a “direct table service” requirement on tip pools. The court explained that are two parts of Labor Code section 351 that are relevant to the “direct” and “indirect” table service issue. First, section 351 provides that “No employer or agent shall collect, take, or receive any gratuity or a part thereof that is paid, given to, or left for an employee by a patron.” Second, section 351 also provides that “[e]very gratuity is hereby declared to be the sole property of the employee or employees to whom it was paid, given, or left for.” Based on a plain reading of the Labor Code, the court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that there had to be direct table service for all employees who were a part of the tip pool.

Plaintiffs also argued that the “direct table service” requirement was established by prior case law in Leighton v. Old Heidelberg, Ltd. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1062. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument on four grounds:

1. The Old Heidelberg case does not define “direct” as opposed to “indirect” service. The court noted that a bartender pouring a drink at the bar could be considered as providing direct table service. The court also noted that Old Heidelberg relied upon “industry practice” of tipping 15% to busboys and 5% to bartenders. Therefore the court could not agree that Old Heidelberg even defined “direct table service” for use as a requirement in this analysis.
2. The “references to direct table service are made in Old Heidelberg without any attempt to fashion a rule that would limit tip pools to servers and busboys.”
3. Old Heidelberg did not establish who which employees, if any, are to be excluded from the tip pools.
4. Old Heidelberg did not decide which limitations on the types of employees are allowed to participate in tip pools, nor did it set forth “criteria or standards” to establish these limitations.

Therefore, the court held that there was no standard that only employees who provided direct table service are those who could participate in tip pools.

The court explained that “[t]ip pools exist to minimize friction between employees and to enable the employer to manage the potential confusion about gratuities in a way that is fair to the employees.” And the artificial distinction between “indirect” and “direct” table service is of no help.

The opinion can be downloaded from the court's website for a short period of time in PDF or Word.

The court set forth the issue in the case:

Tip-pooling, a practice by which tips left by patrons at restaurants and other establishments are shared among employees, is a common practice throughout California and the nation. No California statutes expressly address the practice. In this case, restaurant servers challenge the legality of a mandatory tip-pooling arrangement, whereby, as a condition of their employment, the servers must share tips with certain other employees at the restaurant. While the servers do not contest the requirement that bussers share in the tip pool, they challenge the inclusion of employees who do not provide “direct table service.”

The complaint alleged that Reins has a mandatory tip pooling policy by which its servers are required to “tip out” certain categories of Reins’s employees who do not provide direct table service. Specifically, it is alleged that servers are required to pay a share of their tips to the kitchen staff, bartender, and dishwashers.

Plaintiff alleged that because the tip-pooling policy at issue mandated that employees who do not provide direct table service (such as the kitchen staff) participate in the mandatory tip-pool violates Labor Code section 351, which governs gratuities.  

Tip Credits vs. Tip Pools

The Court clearly explained that tip credits and tip-pools are two different items and should not be confused. Tip credits, where the employer applies a portion of the employees’ tips against the employer’s obligation to pay minimum wage (which were not an issue in this case), are not valid in California:

The first is a practice known as a “tip credit,” by which an employer credits a certain amount of the tips received by an employee against the employee’s wages. In other words, when using a tip credit, the employer pays the employee less than minimum wage, with the understanding that the employee’s tips will make up the difference. As will be discussed at length, tip credits against minimum wage are permissible under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 203(m)); tip credits against minimum wage were once permitted under California law, but were subsequently prohibited by statute. (Henning v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1262, 1270-1275.)

Under tip pooling, employees who receive tips share the tips with other employees in the restaurant. As the court explained, there are different types of tip pooling arrangements:

This case raises the issue of precisely which other employees may participate in a tip pool. In one type of tip pool, the pool is designed to spread the risk of low tipping patrons among all tipped employees; thus, only tipped employees may participate in tip pools. In another type of tip pool; the pools are designed to share tips with non-tipped employees who are considered deserving of tips, but who, for some reason (perhaps tradition, or location) are generally not tipped by patrons.

Labor Code Section 351 - Gratuities

The primary issue of the case is the interpretation of Labor Code section 351.  The court examined the first California court opinion that addressed the validity of tip pools, Leighton v. Old Heidelberg, Ltd. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1062. The court noted that while the Leighton court was primarily resolving the issue of requiring servers to "tip-out" bussers, that ruling also held that bartenders could participate in tip pools.  The Leighton court also stated that tips belong “to the employee[s] who contributed to the service of that patron.” Therefore, the court held that Leighton’s holding and rational extended to all employees who contribute to the service of customers, not just those who provide direct table service. 

The court also held that common sense dictates all employees should be able to participate in a tip-pool:

But a “direct table service” limitation would allow a busser to participate in a tip pool if the busser clears the plates while the patron is still seated at the table, but not to participate if the busser waits until after the patron has departed. The work is the same; the next patron still starts his dining experience with an equally clean table, but the busser who cleans between patrons would be barred from participating in the tip pool because he does not personally interact with any patrons. This illogical result casts doubt on any “direct table service” requirement.

Is this the last word on tip-pools in California? 

Probably not. Judge Croskey, who provided a concurring opinion, and Judge Klein, who provided a dissenting opinion on the "direct table service" issue, both called for the California Supreme Court to review this issue to provide further guidance.

As the Ohio’s Employer’s Blog points out, a DOL audit can feel like an unpleasant medical exam and employers need to be proactive about compliance. Except, I must add, one difference between the medical exam and DOL audit is that you can buy insurance to cover the costs of the medical exam.

In California, employers should review their pay practices, including that employees are paid on time and receive at least the minimum wage for California. For example, employers should insure they are complying with meal and rest break requirements, properly recording meal breaks and the employees’ time worked, properly paying overtime, and reimbursing employees for all business related expenses. Employers employing minors should also carefully examine the child-labor laws applicable to their business, as these requirements are extremely detailed and many well-intentioned employers may still be in violation.

Businesses should also audit whether they have properly classified their exempt employees and independent contractors. A misclassified employee can create a huge amount of liability for a business, as the misclassified employee is entitled to damages for overtime pay, penalties, interest, and their attorney’s fees.

Employers need to be proactive about complying with these complex wage and hour laws. If cost is a concern, complete an in-house audit and then have an attorney double check the policies and practices. It will cost a lot more to contact an attorney after the DOL is in your workplace or the lawsuit has already been filed.

I was recently asked if the severance agreement needs to have a specific title in order to be valid. The title does not have to contain specific words, and are usually titled "general release" or "severance agreement." The title, unless it is clearly erroneous or confusing, does not change the type of agreement or the rights the parties are agreement to release. The key here is what the parties are actually releasing in the terms of the document. 

What claims can the parties agree to release?

Release of Unknown Claims

The idea of the severance agreement is to buy some certainty that there will be no litigation following the employee’s separation from the company. The employee (and employer for that matter) can waive all known claims. However, in California, for any party to release unknown claims, the agreement needs to be clear and advise the party that they are releasing unknown claims. Ideally, the agreement should set forth section 1542 of the Civil Code, which states:

A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.

Release of Age Claims For Older Workers (over 40 years old)

The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA) provides workers over 40 years old with additional rights. The OWBPA places additional requirements on employers asking “old” employees to waive their potential claims the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Here is a summary of the requirements employers need to meet:

• The agreement must be written in a manner that the employee can understand.
• The waiver specifically refers to the employee’s claims or rights under the ADEA.
• The employee cannot waive claims that have not yet arisen
• There must be consideration (the employer must give value to the employee which was not already owed to the employee - this has to be present in every severance agreement, not just those releasing age claims)
• The employee is advised to consult with an attorney
• The employee is given at least 21 days to consider the agreement (the employer may have to offer up to 45 days – the employer should check with counsel to see if this is necessary); and
• The agreement may be revoked up to 7 days after it is executed.

Other Provisions To Consider For Severance Agreements

An employer should also consider if the agreement needs to address other issues, such as:

• Is the release mutual (i.e., the employer and employee are both releasing all claims against each other)?
• Should there be a non-competition/trade secrets provision?
• Is the agreement confidential? If so, is there a liquidated damages provision where the parties agree to a certain monetary amount the breaching party will pay?
• Will the employer provide a reference statement? If so, the language of the statement should be set forth in the agreement.
• Should there be an arbitration provision to deal with any issues that arise from the severance agreement?
• Should the employer include a choice of law clause in the agreement that determines which state law will be controlling in the case of a dispute?

Two former employees of Pick Up Stix sued for claims for unpaid overtime, penalties and interest due to the misclassification of their jobs as exempt from overtime pay. The employer participated in a mediation, but to no success. Stix then decided to approach the putative class members on its own in an attempt to settlement with them individually. Stix offered the putative class members an amount that the employees would have received under the amount offered by Stix during the mediation. More than two hundred current and former employees accepted the settlement amount and signed a general release. The release acknowledged that the employees had spent more than 50% of their time performing managerial duties and agreed “not to participate in any class action that may include …any of the released Claims….” The release also provided:

In exchange for the release from Employee set forth below, the Company will pay Employee by check the gross amount of [varied amounts] less payroll deductions, in full and complete satisfaction of all issues and claims by Employee for unpaid overtime, penalties, interest and other Labor Code violations for the time period of February 28, 1999 through September 2003.

Plaintiffs challenged the settlement agreements arguing that the agreements were void under Labor Code sections 206 and 206.5.

Labor Code section 206.5 provides:

An employer shall not require the execution of a release of a claim or right on account of wages due, or to become due, or made as an advance on wages to be earned, unless payment of those wages has been made. A release required or executed in violation of the provisions of this section shall be null and void as between the employer and the employee. Violation of the provisions of this section by the employer is be a misdemeanor.

In regards to the waivability of overtime rights, Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a) provides:

Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Plaintiffs argued that the release in this case was void as a matter of law to the extent it releases claims for any wages actually due and unpaid and because it constitutes an agreement to work for less than the overtime compensation actually due and unpaid. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument:

The Plaintiffs claim “wages actually due and unpaid” means wages that are disputed, if they are ultimately found to be owing. In other words, the Plaintiffs claim any settlement of a dispute over overtime compensation runs afoul of sections 206.5 and 1194.

The court also noted various federal court cases that have also reached the same conclusion. In Reynov v. ADP Claims Services Group, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Apr.30, 2007), after plaintiff quit his job, he signed an agreement releasing the employer “from ‘all claims, actions, and causes of action, of every kind, nature, and description, which exist as of the date you sign the Letter Agreement, arising out of or related to your employment.’” As consideration for the release, the plaintiff received “substantial compensation to which he was not otherwise entitled, including a severance payment in excess of $29,000.” The plaintiff argued the release was unenforceable under section 206.5. Relying on other state court cases, the Reynov court found that section 206.5 prohibited a release of wages due unless paid in full, and “wages are not due if there is a good faith dispute as to whether they are owed. Because [the employer’s] defense that [the plaintiff] was an exempt employee under California law would, if successful, preclude any recovery for [the plaintiff], a bona fide dispute exists and the overtime pay cannot be considered ‘concededly due.’” (citations omitted)

The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the newly decided case of Edwards v. Arthur Andersen (2008) supports their position. The Plaintiffs contended that because the Supreme Court found in Edwards that an employee’s statutorily unwaivable indemnity rights under Labor Code section 2802 could not be waived as part of a general release, a dispute over past overtime wages cannot be settled. The court recognized that an employee cannot waive his or her right to overtime pay under Labor Code section 1194 (as well as other statutorily provided rights), but the court also reasoned that there was not statute prohibiting employees from releasing their claims to past overtime as settlement “of a bona fide dispute over those wages.”

In conclusion, the court reasoned the public policy underlying section 1194 to protect worker from employer coercion to forgo overtime is not violated by its holding. The releases here were to settle disputes about whether the employees were properly paid in the past and the agreements did not bar employees from suing over future violations.

The opinion can be downloaded from the court's website here in Word or PDF.